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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MYRA MARGIS,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
v.

Appellate Case No. 20010783-CA

BERT LIETZ,
Defendant / Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

PLAINTIFF / APPELLEE (hereinafter "Plaintiff) submits the following as her
brief in the above matter.
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the Order entered by the
trial court on August 22,2001, (R. 467-471) in which the Court grants the Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike an Order of Dismissal submitted by Defendant Bert Lietz pro se on
March 12, 2001, and signed by the trial court on March 14,2001 (R. 253-255).

1

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4,
and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(j).
The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's
Order entered on December 18, 2000, in which the trial court denied Defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 214-215). Defendant had one month from the date of that
final order tofilea notice of appeal; Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September
20, 2001 (R. 471), nine months after the Court entered its final Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves the appellate
court with no jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant / appellant's contentions.
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841(Utah 1980).
In addition, the appellate court does not have authority to review the award of
damages because that issue was never addressed or raised in the trial Court as part of the
original 60(b) motion, but is raised for the first time on appeal. (R. 95-132). Katz v.
Pierce. 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986).

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Myra Margis objects to Defendant Bert Lietz's Statement of Issues on appeal,
because it misstates the standard of review as well as the issues which are properly before
this court for review.
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

In its ruling of August 24,2001, did the trial court err in striking the "Order of
Dismissal" entered on March 14, 2001?
The question of whether trial court properly ordered that the "Order of Dismissal"

be stricken under URCP 60(a) or (b) should be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion. Bishop v. Gentec. Inc.. 2002 UT 36 ^ 27,444 Utah Adv. Rep. 10; Lindsay v.
Atkm, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984). Utah R. Civ P. 60.
Defendant Lietz limits his description of this issue to "whether the dismissal order
was subject to correction as a clerical error," which he describes as "a question of law, to
be reviewed for correctness." Appellant's Brief at 1.
2.

Was a timely notice of appeal filed with respect to Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment?
This is a jurisdictional question before the Appellate Court, which the court may

address at any time, and which is before the Appellate Court de novo. Peay v. Peay, 607
3

P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). This question is dispositive of Defendant's 2 nd issue on appeal,
which is "Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz?"
Appellant's Brief at 2.
3.

In the event the appellate court is able to find jurisdiction to review Lietz's 2 nd
issue on appeal, Plaintiff relies upon Defendant's statement of the issue, with the
standard of review being abuse of discretion.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following rules are applicable to the disposition of this appeal and are

included in the addendum to this brief: Utah R. Civ P. 60; Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Utah R.
App. P. 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Myra Margis believes that Defendant Lietz catalogues all of the filings
which have been submitted in this case. Appellant's Brief at 2-13. Plaintiff will attempt
to condense this to a cohesive narrative.
Plaintiff Myra Margis filed a complaint against Defendant Bert Lietz on August
15, 1994, alleging generally that Margis had borrowed $7,000 from Lietz, posting the
contents of the Carousel Social Club as collateral, and, despite Margis honoring all her
obligations under the promissory note, Lietz wrongfully seized all of the contents of the
4

club, preventing its continued operation and preventing its sale as an ongoing enterprise
to prospective purchasers (R. 1-13). Counsel for Lietz filed an Answer to the Complaint
(R. 20-28), and the court eventually scheduled a trial for July 8,1996, with a pretrial
conference set for June 14,1996 (R. 49).
At the pretrial conference of June 14, 1996, the parties reached an agreement as to
how the case could be settled, with Lietz agreeing to pay Margis $750 and return all of
the equipment and personal property taken from the Carousel Club which he had in his
possession, and both parties agreeing to sign mutual releases of all claims and to have
mutual restraining orders not to harass one another, with the return of property to
Plaintiff to occur within 14 days. (T. 6/14/1996 at 3-9). Defendant Lietz did not comply
with this settlement agreement (egregiously), so Plaintiff never signed or filed any
release papers or filed any dismissal documents. The court was apprised of the failure of
the settlement to be effectuated by a letter Margis (pro se) faxed to the trial court on
November 9, 1997, criticizing her attorney and Lietz (R. 56-57). On January 5,1998, the
Court set the matter for a hearing on April 30,1998, regarding the concerns raised by
Margis' letter (R. 58). On January 7,1998, the hearing was moved by the Court to May
7, 1998 (R. 59-63). On May 13,1998, the Court moved the hearing date to August 14,
1998, after being notified that Lietz's counsel McPhee was on military duty and would
5

be unavailable until early July of 1998. (R. 64; 66). On May 13, 1998, the Court of its
own initiative specifically ordered that "BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH
AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THE CASE MUST BE PRESENT," at the 8/14/98 hearing,
with the threat of sanctions for failure to comply (R. 66). Each of the Court's Notices of
Hearing except for that for the 8/14/98, specifically noted that Non-appearance of
counsel "will result in pleadings being stricken and a default entered" (R. 58, 59-63, 64,
66, 79). The Court was further notified of Defendant Lietz's actions in failing to comply
with the settlement agreement in Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt filed on July 31,1998
(R. 72-74). On July 31,1998, Plaintiff, through counsel, also filed a Notice of intent and
attempts to enter settlement negotiations, which indicated that Defendant's named
counsel McPhee was still out of state and unavailable to attend a hearing until August 24,
1998 (R. 75-76). Plaintiffs motion for contempt was never scheduled for hearing by the
trial court (T. 8/14/1998, T. 8/21/1998).
Plaintiff Myra Margis drove from California to personally attend the August 14,
1998, hearing as ordered by the Court, and her counsel also attended the hearing (T.
8/14/1998). While Defendant's counsel McPhee did not attend the hearing, neither did
any substitute counsel, and, most significantly, neither did the Defendant Bert Lietz. (T.
8/14/1998; R. 79). The Court awarded Plaintiff her travel costs and attorney fees for
6

attending the hearing, and the Court of its own initiative set another hearing for its next
open date, August 21,1998 (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The court specifically ordered that
"failure to appear by the defendant or an attorney for defendant (Mr. McPhie or partners)
will result in the defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for the
plaintiff, " with the Plaintiff allowed to appear by telephone so that she wouldn't be
forced to drivefromCalifornia again (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The Court ordered service
of notice of the hearing both by mail and fax, both by Plaintiffs attorney and by the
Court, on Defendant's attorney McPhee (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The court refrained from
entering judgment for the Plaintiff as a sanction on 8/14/1996 simply because the court
was concerned that adequate notice of that particular sanction had not been provided to
Defendant, and the Court wanted to be sure that sanctions against the Defendant for
failure to appear would "stick," which was the Court's explanation for giving Defendant
Lietz or counsel another opportunity to appear at another hearing (T. 8/14/1998).
On August 21,1998, Plaintiffs Counsel appeared at the Court's scheduled
hearing but neither Defendant Lietz appeared, nor did any counsel on his behalf. The
Court found that notice had been delivered to Defendant's Counsel McPhee, both by the
court and by Plaintiffs counsel. The Court ordered that Defendant's pleadings be
stricken, and that judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of $67,200 plus
7

attorney fees (T. 8/21/1998; R. 88). This was reduced to an Order and Judgment
prepared by Plaintiffs counsel and signed by the Court on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90).
On September 2, 1998, counsel for Lietzfileda Motion to Set Aside Judgment
and Award of Attorney fees, submitting a memorandum and affidavit in support which
explained counsel's inability to personally attend the hearings of 8/14/1998 and
8/21/1998, but which provided no explanation as to the failure of Defendant Lietz to
personally attend either of the hearings as specifically ordered by the Court, or why
alternate counsel did not attend (R. 95-132).
The Court did not rule on (and deny) Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment
until October 27, 2000 (R. 201), in accordance with the court's order of 8/14/1998, that
the case would not "proceed to trial or hearing" until Defendant Lietz paid Plaintiffs
costs and attorney fees for appearing at that day's hearing when Defendant Lietz did not
(R.79).
In the interim, Counsel McPhee for Defendant filed two notices to submit
concerning the Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 133; 189-93). Lietz was ordered to
appear on two separate occasions in supplemental proceedings (R. 154-55; 183-84).
Counsel Ziter appeared on behalf of Lietz,fileda motion for a hearing on the Motion to
Set Aside Judgment, and withdrew from representing Lietz (R. 153; 151; 181).
8

Defendant Lietz pro se, although represented by both McPhee and Ziter at the time, filed
a motion to dismiss the action for a defective summons and failure to comply with URCP
3(a) and 4(c)(2) (R. 160-171), after which Ziter withdrew as Lietz's counsel. Counsel
for Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's pro se motion to dismiss, and shortly
afterward a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, at which time Defendant Lietz pro se withdrew
the motion to dismiss (R. 175-79; 196-98; 199). Counsel for Plaintiff filed a request for
a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 158), and Plaintiff Margis
pro se wrote a letter to the court expressing her displeasure with Defendant Lietz and his
counsel (R. 145-47). Defendant Lietz finally tendered the ordered sanctions of $980.00
to the court at a supplemental proceeding on October 5,2000, along with $300.00 held
towards the judgment against Lietz (R. 193).
Shortly after Lietz paid the $980.00 in sanctions into the Court, on October 27,
2000, the Court signed a minute entry denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the
Judgment (R. 201). Both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant submitted proposed Orders
and Objections to the countervailing proposed Orders, (R. 207-208; 209-210), and
Counsel for Lietz objected to releasing to Plaintiff Margis the $1280.00 held by the
Court (R. 211-13).

9

On December 18, 2000, the Court signed the Order submitted by Plaintiffs
Counsel, which stated that the "Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of
Attorney Fees came before this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to Submit on
October 6, 2 0 0 0 . . . . The Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the
pleadings and the Court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and
Award of Fees remains in place" (R. 214), which quoted the court's language of the
minute entry (R. 201). The Court also signed another Order .Releasing Funds ordering
that the $1280 held by the court be paid to Plaintiff, representing $980 in sanctions and
$300 paid towards the Judgment (R. 223).
The Court entered a final order specifically denying Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment on December 18, 2000 (R. 214-15), but Defendant did not file a notice
of appeal until September 20, 2001 (R. 476).
Despite the entry of the Court's Order on December 18, 2000, affirming the
Judgment entered on August 28,1998, and denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the
Judgment (R. 214-15), and the Order Releasing Funds of December 18, 2001 (R.223), on
February 6,2001, counsel for Lietz filed a Notice to Submit a host of prior motions
which were all clearly resolved or rendered moot by the Court's Orders: these included
objections to both Orders which had been signed by the Court; a Motion to Strike
10

Plaintiffs response to Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment; and Plaintiffs
motion to release funds (R. 227-243). The subject matter of all these motions and
objections, all filed before December 18,2000, were all resolved by the Orders entered
by the Court on December 18,2000 (R. 214-15; 223; 467-471).
The Third District Court Clerk's log indicates that Defendant's Counsel's Notice
to Submit of February 2,2001, was delivered to the Court for Decision on March 12,
2001. On that same day Defendant Lietz, acting pro se, submitted an Order of Dismissal
to the Court, which described the parties as having reached an accord and satisfaction on
14 June 1996, that all elements of that agreement had been satisfied, and that the case
should be dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996 (R. 253-255). On March 14,
2001, the court signed the Order of Dismissal prepared and submitted by the Defendant
pro se two days earlier, on March 12,2001 (R. 253-255). On its face the Order of
Dismissal appeared to contradict all of the rulings of the trial court for the previous three
years.
Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Garnishment for First Security Bank on April 10,
2001, and subsequently another Writ of Garnishment for America First Credit Union on
June 26, 2001 (R.345-363). On July 5,2001, counsel for Lietz moved to quash and
recall the Writ of Garnishment for America First Credit Union, based on the dismissal
11

order signed March 14, 2001 (R. 363-371). Counsel for Plaintiff Margis filed a response
to the Defendant's motion to quash on July 15, 2001 (R. 431-442), and Defendant
requested an enlargement of time to file a reply on July 20, 2001 (R. 443-44).
On July 15, 2001, Counsel for Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Order of
Dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) or (b), with arguments for several alternative
grounds, but primarily as a clerical error in that the Order of Dismissal rendered the
previous Orders relating to the judgment entered against the Defendant unclear, as
judgment was entered against the Defendant as sanctions for failing to comply with the
settlement agreement and subsequent orders of the Court after 14 June 1996 (R. 372430). Defendant never opposed or filed any response to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Order, which the court subsequently granted (R. 470-71).
Plaintiff filed a notice to submit of the Motion to Strike Order, and of Defendant's
Motion to Quash, on August 3, 2001 (R. 445). Then on August 13, 2001, Defendant
filed a reply to Plaintiffs response to Defendant's Motion to Quash (R. 448-454), and
Defendant moved to strike all of Plaintiff s pleadings after October 10,2000 (R. 455456). On August 16, 2001, Defendant then filed his own notice to submit the
Defendant's Motion to Strike, the Motion to Quash, and the Motion to Enlarge Time (R.
461- 66). Defendant did not respond to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Order.
12

On August 22, 2001, the Court entered its "Court's Ruling," striking the Order of
Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001 (R. 470-71). The Court described in detail its
reasoning for striking the Order of Dismissal, as well as how it initially entered the
Order of Dismissal. The Court does not specify whether it is ruling under URCP 60(a)
or (b), but states two distinct reasons for striking the order of dismissal: 1, " The Court
now determines that the Order of Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and
Order": 2. "In addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord
and satisfaction" (R. 470, emphasis in original). The Court noted the confusion created
by Defendant Lietz filing pro se documents at the same time that he was represented by
one and two separate attorneys (R. 468-69,471). The Court also described the history of
the case, affirmed that all of Defendant's subsidiary motions and objections had been
denied with the Orders of December 18 and 19,2000, and denied Defendant's Motion to
Quash and Motion to Strike (R. 467-71).
On September 20, 2001, Defendant Lietz, by counsel, filed a notice of appeal of
the "Court's Ruling" of August 22, 2001. (R. 476).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant Lietz states that "there are no additional facts in the record to consider
pertaining to this appeal, other than those stated in the Statement of the Case"
13

(Appellant's Brief at 13). Defendant Lietz fails to cite or provide transcripts of the
hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, when the Court made its findings of
fact and ordered that judgment be entered against the Defendant Lietz. Defendant
Lietz's failure to marshal the evidence concerning these two hearings are particularly
problematic because of Defendant's allegations on appeal that Judgment was entered
against Lietz because of out-of-court contempt (Appellant's Brief at 24-5, 36-7), when
the transcripts of the 8/14/98 and 8/21/98 hearings (as well as the notice of the 8/14/1998
hearing prepared by the Court on May 13,1998), demonstrate that the court's sanctions
and entry of judgment against Defendant Lietz were for Lietz's (or counsel's) personal
failure to appear before the Court, as specifically ordered by the Court. The facts not
marshaled would indicate that the Court's sanctions and entry of Judgment against
Defendant Lietz were for his failure to appear for the Court's duly noticed and scheduled
hearings.
Defendant Lietz also does not describe the allegations made to the Court by
Plaintiff and by Plaintiffs counsel concerning Lietz's failure to comply with the initial
settlement agreement, in which Lietz failed to sign an inventory of the items he had
provided to Plaintiff, that Lietzrippedthe settlement check from Plaintiffs attorney's
hand and drove away, nearly knocking down Plaintiffs attorney Nathan Pace with his
14

truck. For the next two years Defendant refused to redeliver the check or participate in
attempts to comply with the settlement agreement. (R. 56-57, 72-74, 145-47).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Order, concerning the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, because the Motion to
Strike Order was not opposed by Defendant. The accurate record of the Court should
indicate that although a settlement agreement was reached on June 14,1996, the case was
never dismissed (because of non-completion of the terms of the agreement), and
judgment was eventually entered against defendant because of non-compliance with
Orders by the Court to appear before the Court.
The trial Court's accurate determination "that the Order of Dismissal does conflict
with the prior Judgment and Order" (R. 470) indicates that the Court's ruling fell under
URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. The Court's
additional finding that "it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord
and satisfaction" (R. 470), also points to alternative grounds to strike the Order pursuant
to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. To address both
15

concerns, the Court struck the Order of Dismissal which had left the record of the case
unclear, and clarified the record of the case in its "Court's Ruling" entered on August 22,
2001 (R. 467-71).
In appealing the Court's grant of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Order, Defendant
fails to marshal any evidence which supports the Trial Court's rulings, and fails to point
out any fatal flaw in the Trial Court's reasoning, which would be the basis for finding an
abuse of discretion. As such the burden of the appeal is not met and must be dismissed.
The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's
Order entered on December 18, 2000, in which the trial court denied Defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 214-215). Defendant devotes the balance of his appeal
attempting to argue that "the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default
Judgment" and discussing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of
Attorney Fees (Appellant's Brief at 23-32), which was filed by Defendant on September
2, 1998, (R. 95-132) and specifically denied by the Trial Court in its Order entered on
December 18,2000 (R. 214). Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules
3 and 4, failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves the appellate court with no
jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant / appellant's contentions. Peay v. Peav,
607 P.2d841(Utah 1980).
16

In the event the appellate Court reaches the merits of the question of whether the
trial Court erred in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz, the trial Court
did not abuse its discretion, in that Defendant presents no argument or explanation for
why Defendant Lietz did not personally appear at the court-ordered hearings, as ordered
by the Court.
Defendant also fails to marshal any of the evidence, or discuss the findings of the
trial court at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998, concerning the court's orders of
sanctions for Defendant Lietz to appear, regardless of the actions or ability of his named
counsel to appear. Without marshaling the evidence or pointing out any fatal flaw in the
Court's reasoning, the court's factual findings must be accepted as true.
Defendant raises the issue of damages for the first time on appeal, so the issue is
not properly before the Court of Appeals. Also concerning Defendant's discussion of the
damages awarded, or the need for affidavits to support damages, Defendant does not
marshal, present, or address any evidence of the testimony taken by the trial court from
the Plaintiff at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998 concerning the propriety and
sufficiency of the damages requested in the Complaint.
Concerning the allegations of indirect contempt, the hearing of August 14, 1998,
was ordered by the Court as a pretrial conference on May 13, 1998 (R.66). No contempt
17

was cited by the court as justification for its orders, and any contempt would have been
in-court contempt for failure to appear. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah
1988). By any means, the Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the
Judgment entered against Defendant, as the Court's specific purpose in setting an
additional hearing on August 21, 1998, was to ensure that the Court's actions were
proper and would not be amenable to attack on appeal. (T. 8/14/1998; T. 8/21/1998).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER,
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS UNOPPOSED.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Order, concerning the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, because the Motion to
Strike Order was not opposed by Defendant. Defendant did not file any response to
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Order, and Plaintiffs motion was ruled on properly as the
subject of a Notice to Submit (R. 445). The court found valid reasons to strike the Order
of dismissal, and its discretion should not be disturbed.
POINT 2

THE TRIAL COURT ACCURATELY DETERMINED THAT THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
UNDER URCP 60(a) and (b)(6).
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The trial Court's accurate determination "that the Order of Dismissal does conflict
with the prior Judgment and Order" (R. 470) indicates that the Court's ruling fell under
URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. The Court's
additional finding that "it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord
and satisfaction" (R. 470), also points to alternative grounds to strike the Order pursuant
to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. To address both
concerns, the Court struck the Order of Dismissal which had left the record of the case
unclear, and clarified the record of the case in its "Court's Ruling" entered on August 22,
2001 (R. 467-71).
DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14,2001, COULD BE
STRICKEN OR AMENDED IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE STATUS OF THE
COURT'S ORDERS, AS "ANY OTHER REASON" PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(6)
The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant on August 28,1998,
even though the parties had previously reached a settlement agreement. While the Third
District Court Clerk's record still accurately reflected that a valid judgment had been
entered against the Defendant, the presence of an Order of Dismissal in the record
19

effective two years prior to the Entry of Judgment created the possibility of confusion
regarding the Court's orders. The Defendant filed a motion to quash a valid garnishment
based on the Order of Dismissal. Because of confusion created, the trial Court had the
authority to clarify the order under the authority of URCP 60(b)(6).
"A Motion for 'Clarification of Judgment' is not specifically provided for in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the substance of the motion is to make clear a
judgment that it is not already clear. If the clarity of the judgment is called into question
because the opposing party is improperly applying the judgment, then implicit in the
motion is a request to change the judgment to provide relief to a party harmed by the lack
of clarity. Accordingly, we hold that in the case before us, appellees motion for
clarification, in which appellants joined, was sufficient to invoke Rule 60(b)." Kunzler v.
O'delL 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 855 P.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1993).
"A court may grant relief under subsection [six] of Rule 60(b) for any reason other
than the first [five] enumerated by the rule if relief is justified, and the motion is made
within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons
Co., Inc.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). Kunzler v. O'dell. Plaintiff does not
claim "(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;" as the basis of this
60(b) motion because the Judgment entered against Defendant on August 28, 1998, was
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correctly not affected by the Order of Dismissal. Two valid garnishments were issued by
the Court subsequent to the Defendant's Order of Dismissal, one on April 10, 2001, and
one on June 26, 2001. The motion was also not based on "(3) fraud." The 60(b)(6)
motion was for the purpose of clarifying the Court's Record concerning the Order of
Dismissal, so that it remained clear to Court personnel or other judges evaluating the
validity of writs of garnishment that a valid Judgment has been entered and affirmed by
this court (on December 18, 2000), despite the entry of dismissal at a prior date.
For greatest clarity of the record, the Order of Dismissal was stricken, with a new
Order prepared which clearly describes the record of this Case. The trial Court corrected
the Order to reflect that despite the previous settlement agreement, a Judgment was
subsequently entered against Defendant.
Relief under URCP 60 (a) may be sought "at any time." Relief under URCP 60
(b)(6) must be sought within "a reasonable time." The Court issued two valid
garnishments since the entry of the Order of Dismissal. Defendant created an apparent
need for clarification of the Order of Dismissal byfilinga Motion to Quash the last Writ
of Garnishment. The Motion to Strike wasfiledfour months after the Order was signed,
and less than one week after Plaintiff first received actual notice of the Order of
Dismissal. No party was prejudiced in the passage of time from the signing of the Order
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of Dismissal. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Order of dismissal under URCP 60(b)(6)
was timely.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL PREPARED BY PLAINTIFF PRO SE INCORRECTLY STATED THAT
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE CASE,
PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a), THE COURT STRUCK THE ORDER TO PREVENT
THE APPEARANCE OF A MISTAKE IN THE RECORD
URCP 60(a) provides that clerical errors in orders may be corrected at any time.
A Clerical amendment to an order "is one which is intended to make the judgment speak
the truth by showing what the judicial action really w a s . . . " Richards v. Siddoway. 24
Utah 2d 314,471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970). A clerical error is not a "judicial error"; A
clerical amendment cannot correct a judicial decision by "making [a judgment] express
something which the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the
first instance." Richards. The trial Court found that the Defendant's Order of Dismissal
did not accurately reflect the actual rulings of the Court, and as such was subject to
being stricken or corrected.
The Defendant's Order of Dismissal decreed that "the parties did reach an accord
and satisfaction in this matter." The record of the hearing on June 14, 1996, indicates
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that while the Court recognized that an agreement for settlement was reached (an
accord), satisfaction of that agreement was never provided. The extensive proceedings
following that hearing, and the Court's eventual entering of Judgment against the
Defendant on August 28,1998, are the result of the Court's actual determination that the
Defendant had not complied with or provided satisfaction to that settlement agreement
and subsequent court orders.
If a judge erroneously assumes that an order presented by a party and signed by
the judge correctly reflects the judge's Judgment, that is a mistake of a perfunctory or
clerical nature which the court can and properly should correct upon its own motion.
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196,299 P.2d 827 (1956). In this case the Court
explicitly determined that the Order prepared by Plaintiff Pro Se and signed by the Court
did not accurately reflect the Judgments entered in this case, so it was stricken by the
Court (R. 470).
Defendant's Order of Dismissal states that an accord and satisfaction was
completed on June 14,1996. While an initial settlement agreement was reached in court,
Satisfaction was never delivered. Defendant did not comply with the settlement
agreement or with further court orders. As partial sanctions for Defendant's noncompliance, Defendant's Answer was stricken and judgment was entered against him.
23

As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, the settlement agreement and the potential
dismissal of the case was voided. While an order could be entered reflecting the court
hearing of June 14, 1996, the Order of Dismissal does not clearly reflect the status of this
case. The Order of the case should reflect that notwithstanding the settlement agreement,
Judgment was entered against Plaintiff on August 28,1998. To correct the appearance
of an oversight in the record, the Court properly struck the Defendant's Order of
Dismissal and entered its own Order to reflect that Judgment was subsequently entered
against Defendant. URCP 60(a) again provides that the Court may make this correction
at any time of its own initiative.
THE ORDER OF MARCH 14, 2001, WAS SIGNED AS A CLERICAL ERROR BY
THE COURT, AND WAS VALIDLY STRICKEN PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a)
Even though a valid Judgment remained in place against Defendant, the Order of
Dismissal was signed as a mistake or clerical error by the Court. On February 2, 2001,
Defendant's Counsel submitted a Notice to Submit encompassing seven different
procedural motions, objections, and orders. Court records indicate that on March 12,
2001, the Notice to Submit was delivered to Judge Lewis for ruling, on the same day that
Defendant pro se filed a totally separate Order of Dismissal with the Court. Plaintiffs
counsel never received a copy of this order or was given any opportunity to respond to
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the order. On March 14, 2001, at most two days after being filed, that Order of
Dismissal was signed by the Court, although it was never the subject of any Notice to
Submit or other Motion before the court.
URCP 60(a) allows that clerical mistakes in "orders or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight.. .may be corrected by the court at any time of
its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders." As a clerical error or mistake, the signed Order of Dismissal could be stricken
by the Court immediately. The trial Court did not specifically state whether it was
striking the Order of Dismissal as a clerical error, but it had the authority to do so.
POINT 3

DEFENDANT LIETZ FAILS TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN STRIKING
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL.

"As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on finding of fact, appellant must
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate 'that the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the
findings.'" Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322,1328 (Utah App. 1993). Compliance with
the marshaling step is mandatory, State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487,491 (Utah App.) affd,
cert granted. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Our insistence on compliance with the
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marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over
substance."), and the standard for compliance is high. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
C a , 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991).
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
Id. at 1315.
Additionally, simply listing the evidence is not enough. Once the supporting
evidence is listed with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must also
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings
when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision.
Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134,138 (Utah App. 1992). To do this, appellant
must point to a specific "fatal flaw" in the evidence upon which the trial court based its
decision, and "convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City. 818 P.2d at 1315. See also Stewart.
831 P.2d at 138 (after coming "close" to marshaling evidence, appellant fails to "draw
this court's attention to any flaw in the evidence upon which the [administrative law
judge] relied").
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If an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must
assume that the findings are correct and supported by the evidence, e.g., Crockett v.
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1992). Appellate courts have shown no reluctance in
affirming the findings of the trial court where appellant does not properly marshal the
evidence. See Ong Int'l flJ.S.Al Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,457 (Utah 1993);
Robb,863P.2datl328; West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313.
Here, Defendant Lietz does not even attempt to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings. Appellant's Brief at 13. Nowhere in Defendant Lietz's
argument does he address a single piece of evidence supporting the trial court's decision.
Appellant's Brief at 14-32. Furthermore, Defendant Lietz never cites a single finding of
fact or conclusion of law. Id. Instead, Defendant Lietz merely repeats the arguments he
made to the trial court. Id. Essentially, Defendant Lietz treats this Court as if it were
"simply a depository" into which it can "dump the burden of argument and research,"
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 491, which is exactly what the marshaling requirement was designed
to prevent. IcL Accordingly, Plaintiff Margis respectfully submits that Defendant Lietz's
failure to marshal the evidence compels this Court to affirm the trial court's Order
Striking the Order of Dismissal.
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In appealing the Court's grant of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Order, Defendant
fails to marshal any evidence which supports the Trial Court's rulings, and fails to point
out any fatal flaw in the Trial Court's reasoning, which would be the basis for finding an
abuse of discretion. As such the burden of the appeal is not met and must be dismissed.
POINT 4

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
ENTERED ON DECEMBER 18, 2000, IN WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT.

Defendant did not file any notice of appeal relating to the Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, signed on December 18,2000 (R. 214-215).
The Final Order in this case was signed August 28, 1998, and Defendant Lietz did not
file an appeal of that Judgment. Defendant devotes the balance of his appeal attempting
to argue that "the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment" and
discussing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees
(Appellant's Brief at 23-32), which wasfiledby Defendant on September 2,1998, (R.
95-132) and specifically denied by the Trial Court in its Order entered on December 18,
2000 (R. 214). Defendant did not appeal that specific andfinalorder.
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Although Defendant conceivably asked for reconsideration of the court's order,
concerning a "motion to reconsider," the Utah Supreme Court is "unaware of any such
motion under our rules" Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), citing Utah State
Employees Credit Union v. Riding. 24 Utah 2d 211,469 P.2d 1 (1970). Although
Defendant had one month from the date of that final order tofilea notice of appeal,
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 20,2001 (R. 471), nine months after
the Court entered its final Order denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
Defendant did not file any intervening motion which tolled the time for filing an appeal.
"The Trial Court is not to be in a position of acting as a court of review of its own
ruling," Peav. citing Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74,415 P.2d 662 (1966). Pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, failure tofilea timely notice of
appeal leaves the appellate court with no jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant
/ appellant's contentions. Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
POINT 5

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT, AS DEFENDANT
AGAIN DOES NOT MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE CONCERNING
DEFENDANT LIETZ'S FAILURE TO APPEAR
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In the event the appellate Court reaches the merits of the question of whether the
trial Court erred in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz, the trial Court
did not abuse its discretion, in that Defendant presents no argument or explanation for
why Defendant Lietz did not personally appear at the court-ordered hearings, as ordered
by the Court.
Defendant fails to marshal any of the evidence, or discuss the findings of the trial
court at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998, concerning the court's orders of
sanctions for Defendant Lietz to appear, regardless of the actions or ability of his named
counsel to appear. Without marshaling the evidence or pointing out any fatal flaw in the
Court's reasoning, the court's factual findings must be accepted as true. With the same
argument previously made concerning the duty to marshal the evidence, Plaintiff Margis
respectfully submits that Defendant Lietz's failure to marshal the evidence compels this
Court to affirm the trial court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the
Judgment.
POINT 6

APPELLATE COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE AMOUNT OF THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND DEFENDANT AGAIN
FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
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The appellate court does not have authority to review the award of damages
because that issue was never addressed or raised in the trial Court as part of the original
60(b) motion, but is raised for the first time on appeal. (R. 95-132). Katz v. Pierce. 41
Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). Also concerning Defendant's discussion of
the damages awarded, or the need for affidavits to support damages, Defendant does not
marshal, present, or address any evidence of the testimony taken by the trial court from
the Plaintiff at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998 concerning the propriety and
sufficiency of the damages requested in the Complaint.
POINT 7

CONTEMPT WAS NEVER ORDERED OR ADDRESSED BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN ENTERING JUDGMENT

Concerning the allegations of indirect contempt, the hearing of August 14,1998,
was ordered by the Court as a pretrial conference on May 13, 1998 (R.66). No contempt
was cited by the court as justification for its orders, and any contempt would have been
in-court contempt for failure to appear. Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah
1988).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant Lietz filed a timely notice of appeal solely as to one issue, the Motion
to Strike Defendant's Order of Dismissal, and that motion was granted on several
grounds by the Trial Court after being unopposed by Defendant. Defendant Lietz fails to
marshal any evidence as to why it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to Strike
the Order of Dismissal.
The Appellate Court does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, because the final order regarding that
motion was entered on December 18, 2000, nine months before a notice of appeal was
filed in this case. Regardless Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence concerning
the trial court's denial of that motion.
Plaintiff Myra Margis respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to deny
Defendant Lietz's Appeal and award her costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of
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DAVID S. PACE
NATHAN D. PACE
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff
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Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
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verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
n opposition to motion for new trial in civil
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
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jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre- alone new trial granted on ground of inademises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 875.
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
After-acquired evidence of employee's misof same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 conduct as barring or limiting recovery in aeAL.R.3d 1101.
tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 59
Jurors voir dire denial or nondisclosure of A.L.R.5th 1.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors tKerei!T*artsing from oversight or omission may be
corrected bv the court a{, anytime of its owrj jpitifltive or on thejmotion of any
party a'nrjjffier such notice, if any, as^th^ourt^rrjgrs. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
U T
*^ Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
gment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
a
P*?or Judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
aDnl* +'°T ^ *S n o * o n 6 e r equitable that the judgment should have prospective
judg-m n ; o r ^ a n 5 r ot her reason justifying relief from the operation of the
(1) (2) (Q e m o t * o n s ^ a ^ be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
Ws e V°r A n 0 t m ° r e ^ a n ^ m o n t ^ s a ^ t e r the judgment, order, or proceeding
finalityf
° r t a k e n - Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
a
Power of ^ u d g m e n t o r suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
judgme^ C ° ? r t t o e n t e r t a i n an independent action to relieve a party from a
c
er
°urt. Th'
° r p r o c e e ^ n g o r t o s e t a s ide a judgment for fraud upon the
m
6 proce ure or
otion as
^ f obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
(AmenHnri p ^? scri bed in these rules or by an independent action.
^ e n d e d effective April 1,1998.)
Advisory Com •+
N te
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° ' ~~ T h e 1 9 9 8 s e r v e d u p o n t h e d e f e n d a n t as required by Rule
as ound
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s for a motion 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
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*mmons in J~ . _\. w h e n » for any cause, the said action." This basis for a motion is not found
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clearly meritorious, it would support a suspension of the time limitation contained in Rule 10,
Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Cited in Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 (10th
Cir. 1992).

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
OF TRIAL COURTS
Rule 3- Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as
well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation ofparties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, 'or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name
of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate,
joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the
clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment
of the required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy
of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not

^j.rvn IVUDJLO u r Arr^LioATE FKUCEDURE
an appeal may be taken. Sait Lake City Corp. v.
Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
A partial summary judgment is not generally
a final judgment and hence it is not appealable
under the limitations prescribed by this rule.
South Shores Concession, Inc. v. State, 600 P.2d
550 (Uta)i 1979).
District court order setting aside certain provisions in a default decree of divorce and providing for a further hearing on the matter was
not a final ruling from which an appeal could be
taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 (Utah
1982).
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R e v i e w of acquittal prohibited.
An appellate court may not reassess an acquittal even though the acquittal was made
under an incorrect application of the law or an
improper determination of the facts. State v
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
S u m m a r y judgment.
Order setting aside summary judgment was
not final judgment from which aggrieved person might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968).
Order denying a motion for summary judgment was not a final order and was not appealable. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
A summary judgment in favor of one defendant alone is not a final judgment where the
action against the remaining defendant remains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d 1306
(Utah 1983).

Postjudgrnent orders.
An order vacating a judgment is not a final
order from which an appeal can be taken pursuant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 597
P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979).
The final judgment rule does not preclude
review of postjudgrnent orders; such orders
were independently subject to the test of finality, according to their own substance and effect.
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). // ,U n s i g n e d m i n u t e entry.
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute
P u r p o s e of n o t i c e .
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgThe object of a notice of appeal is to advise
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Manthe opposite party t h a t an appeal h a s been
ning, 645 R2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State Tax
taken from a specific judgment in a particular
Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1986);
case. Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15
Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 1986);
Utah 2d 126, 388 R2d 798 (1964).
Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 (Utah
1986).
R e v i e w in e q u i t y c a s e s .
In the appeal of an equity case, t h e Supreme
An unsigned minute entry does not constiCourt may weigh the facts as well as review the
tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State v.
law, but will reverse on the facts only when the
Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
evidence clearly preponderates against the
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v.
1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct.
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981).
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in App. 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335 (Utah
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give
Ct. App. 1998); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965
due deference to the trial court's decision and
reverse only when the evidence clearly preponP.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Dipoma v.
derated against the trial court's findings.
McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, 1 P.3d 564, cert,
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981).
granted, 9 R3d 170 (Utah 2000)f
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law R e v i e w . — Case Law Development: I. Appellate Review and Procedure, 1998
Utah L. Rev. 585.

A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A.L.R.4th 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule

465

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 4

of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal, within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.)
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (f).
The 1999 amendment deleted provisions for

motions under Rule 26 from t h e second sentence in Subdivision (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Administrative actions.
Attorney fees.
Attorney's failure to file notice.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
—Amendment or modification of judgment.
—Construction.
—Denied.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Form of notice.
Post-judgment motions.
Pre-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
—Final judgments.

Administrative actions.
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for
review of administrative actions. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The cross-appeal provisions of this rule do
not apply to proceedings for judicial review of
agency decisions. Viktron/Lika U t a h v. Labor
Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8, 412 U t a h Adv. Rep.
43, — P.3d —.
Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in defending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Attorney's failure to file n o t i c e .
wv.™.** if Tiri+Vkin fKo cfnhitnrv nrriod for

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, STATE OP UTAH

;iyra Margis

.

VS
Bert Lietz

.

SCHEDULING ORDER
CASE NO. 940905177
JUDGE LESLIE A LEWIS

COUNSEL ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT A HEARING HAS BEEN SET ON
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE ON THE 30th DAY OF April r 1998 AT 10:30
AM WITH THE HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS. THE COURT HAS SCHEDULED 1/2
HOUR FOR THIS HEARING.
THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WILL BE ARGUED TO THE COURT:
1. Letter written by Myra Margis dated 11/3/97
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WILL RESULT IN
PLEADINGS BEING STRICKEN AND A DEFAULT ENTERED. COUNSEL ARE TO
NOTIFY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY, IF THEIR CALENDAR DOES NOT PERMIT
THIS HEARING.

DATED THIS 5th DAY OF JAN,~;i998

HONORABLE Leslie A' Lewis?fcP /

Case No: 940905177
Date:
Jan 06, 1998
CERTIFICATE*OF NOTICE
I certify that a copy of the enclosed notice was sent to the
following people by the method and on the date specified,
DATE

METHOD

01/06/98

Mail

01/06/98

Mail

NAME
JEROLD D- MCPHIE
VALLEY TOWER, 10TH FLOOR
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000
NATHAN D. PACE
47 west 200 so, suite 102
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000

Deputy Court Clerk
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court at 801-535-5009 at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
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NOVEMBER 3 , 1 9 9 7
I'AcE, ATTY.

NAIMAN

MR. MCE.

Of J#90

5/?-}

I AM WRITING YOU & JUDGE LESLEY LEWIS THIS LETTER OF FACTS IN
REQUEST FOR A FULL REFUND AS YOU DID MOT & STILL HAVE NOT
""
FOLLOWED UP ON MY CASE WHICH I P A I E T F O R !
BERT LIETZ WAS ALLOWED TO DO JUST AS HE HAS
BEFORE TO RUN LOOSE & TAKE FROM INNOCENT PEOPLE.
BERT HAD A DIRECT ORDER TO COMPLY FROM JUDGE LEWIS & DID NOT
EVEN COME CLOSE TO HER REQUEST. SHE STATED H E M U S T
DO
BUT HEDID NOT & IS_ST_ILL LOOSE. YOU FORCED ME TO GO INTO HER
CHAMBERS WITH AN U N T K L T H & Lttl AS A biQ JOKE & STILL IS. 1
WAS ORDERED BY JUDGE LEWIS TO DO THIS & ACCEPT IT , I BELIEVE
SHE TOLD ME. THIS JOKE OF A SETTLEMENT & I NEVER EVEN GOT
THAT. I HAD TO DRIVE TWICE TO SLC & TWICE BERT DID NOT
fftum v

WHEN HE FINALLY DID SHOW UP HE COMES WITH A PICK UP TRUCK OF
BINGO CLUB STUFF WHEN HE GOT AWAY WITH 2 30 FOOT RYDER TRUCKS
FULL. BERT THREATENED ME , TRIED TO HIT YOU, TRIED TO HIT MY
HUSBAND WITH HIS TRUCK WHICH HAD 2 DIFFERENT PLATES WHICH I
CALLED BACK TO YOU & AGAIN YOU DID NOTHING. I DID NOT EVENGET 1/3 OF MY STUFF BACK NOR THE PEOPLE'S THINGS, NOR MY
MONEY
BERT WAS ORDERED TO PAY BY JUDGE LEWIS,
WHICH I WAS ENTITLED TO BY THE LAW THAT STATES THE JUDGES
ORDERS ARE TO BE OBEYED. . WELL!!!!!!!!!!!??????
BERT STALKED ME TIL I HAD TO LEAVE SLC & FINALLY THE STATE.
YOU WERE AT MY HOME WHEN HE WAS TO SEND THE MUSCLE PEOPLE TO
STEAL MY PERSONAL BELONGINGS RIGHT OUT OF MY HOME. YOU HEARD
THE THREATENING TAPES, YOU CALLED THIS SO CALLED MARSHALL,
BERT GOT AWAY WITH THAT ALSO AS YOU DID NOTHING TIL WE HAD TO
SELL & MOVE. & HE IS STILL BRAGGING HOW HE MADE MYRA'S BIGFANCY ATTORNEY COWTIE TO HIM. I AM TRULY SORRY I EVER GOT
INVOLVED WITH YOU AS YOU ARE WITH ME T'M SURE.
I HOPE MY REFUND ALONG WITH ALL MY TAPES OF THE CLUB & PAPERS
I GAVE YOU WILL BE IN THE MAIL TO ME WITHIN THE WEEK. I WILL
WAIT 1 WEEK, 5 WORKING DAYS, TO HEAR FROM YOU & JUDGE LEWIS
CONCERNING THIS MATTER. THEN I WILL ASK FOR AN INQUIRY INTO
JUDGE LEWIS, YOU & MCPHEE INTO THIS WHOLE JOKE OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM ALONG WITH BERT.
I NEVER GOT MY DAY IN COURT NOR MY SAY, BUT BERT WAS ALLOWED
TO SPEAK TO THE JUDGE & LOOK WHAT HAPPENED. THIS MAN IS
DEFINITELY A THREAT TO SOCIETY & ME & SHOULD BE STOPPED.
REMEMBER JUDGE LEWIS'S CLERK, BERT & HIS ATTORNEY GOT AWAY
WITH CHANGING THE COURT DATE SO YOU & I WOULD NOT BE THERE &
OF COURSE I GOT BLAMED FOR A NO SHOW & YOU DID NOTHING ABOUT

THAT EITHER. I FEEL I WAS TOTALLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST & YOU
ALLOWED ALL OF THIS TO CONTINUE FOR 4/5 YEARS & IT SHOULD OF
BEEN SETTLED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS. BUT OF COURSE
YOU GOT MORE MONIES THAT WAY. WELL I HOPE YOU WILL DO THE
RIGHT THING AS A PERSON IF NOT AS AN ATTORNEY.
MYRA MARGIS
PO BOX 605
MESQUITE. NV 89024-0605
CC; NATHAN PACE
<HJBGE«LESLEY_ LEW I Si
MCPHEE, ATTORNEY
UTAH BAR ASSOCIATION

NOVEMBER 3. 1997
NATHAN PACE, ATTY.
MR. PACE,
I AM WRITING YOU & -JUDGE LESLEY LEWIS THIS LETTER OF FACTS IN
REQUEST FOR A FULL REFUND AS YOU DID NOT & STILL HAVE NOT
FOLLOWED UP ON MY CASE WHICH 1 PAID FOR.
BERT LIETZ WAS ALLOWED TO DO JUST AS HE HAS
BEFORE TO RUN LOOSE & TAKE FROM INNOCENT PEOPLE.
BERT HAD A DIRECT ORDER TO COMPLY FROM JUDGE LEWIS & DID NOT
EVEN COME CLOSE TO HER REQUEST, SHE STATED H E M U S T
DO
BUT HE DID NOT & IS STILL LOOSE. YOU FORCED ME TO GO INTO HER
CHAMBERS WITH AN UNTRUTH & LEFT AS A BIG JOKE & STILL IS. I
WAS ORDERED BY JUDGE LEWIS TO DO THIS & ACCEPT IT , 1 BELIEVE
SHE TOLD ME, THIS JOKE OF A SETTLEMENT & I NEVER EVEN GOT
THAT. 1 HAD TO DRIVE TWICE TO SLC & TWICE BERT DID NOT
COMPLY.
WHEN HE FINALLY DID SHOW UP HE COMES WITH A PICK UP TRUCK OF
BINGO CLUB STUFF WHEN HE GOT AWAY WITH 2 30 FOOT RYDER TRUCKS
FULL. BERT THREATENED ME , TRIED TO HIT YOU, TRIED TO HIT MY
HUSBAND WITH HIS TRUCK WHICH HAD 2 DIFFERENT PLATES WHICH I
CALLED BACK TO YOU & AGAIN YOU DID NOTHING. I DID NOT EVEN
GET 1/3 OF MY STUFF BACK NOR THE PEOPLE'S THINGS, NOR MY
MONEY
BERT WAS ORDERED TO PAY BY JUDGE LEWIS,
WHICH I WAS ENTITLED TO BY THE LAW THAT STATES THE JUDGES
ORDERS ARE TO BE OBEYED.. WELL!!!!!!!!!! !??????
BERT STALKED ME TIL I HAD TO LEAVE SLC & FINALLY THE STATE.
YOU WERE AT MY HOME WHEN HE WAS TO SEND THE MUSCLE PEOPLE TO
STEAL MY PERSONAL BELONGINGS RIGHT OUT OF MY HOME, YOU HEARD
THE THREATENING TAPES, YOU CALLED THIS SO CALLED MARSHALL.
BERT GOT AWAY WITH THAT ALSO AS YOU DID NOTHING TIL WE HAD TO
SELL & MOVE. & HE IS STILL BRAGGING HOW HE MADE MYRA'S BIG
FANCY ATTORNEY COWTIE TO HIM. I AM TRULY SORRY I EVER GOT
INVOLVED WITH YOU AS YOU ARE WITH ME I'M SURE.
I HOPE MY REFUND ALONG WITH ALL MY TAPES OF THE CLUB & PAPERS
I GAVE YOU WILL BE IN THE MAIL TO ME WITHIN THE WEEK. I WILL
WAIT I WEEK. 5 WORKING DAYS, TO HEAR FROM YOU & JUDGE LEWIS
CONCERNING THIS MATTER. THEN I WILL ASK FOR AN INQUIRY INTO
JUDGE LEWIS, YOU & MCPHEE INTO THIS WHOLE JOKE OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM ALONG WITH BERT.
I NEVER GOT MY DAY IN COURT NOR MY SAY, BUT BERT WAS ALLOWED
TO SPEAK TO THE JUDGE & LOOK WHAT HAPPENED. THIS MAN IS
DEFINITELY A THREAT TO SOCIETY & ME & SHOULD BE STOPPED.
REMEMBER JUDGE LEWIS'S CLERK, BERT & HIS ATTORNEY GOT AWAY
WITH CHANGING THE COURT DATE SO YOU & I WOULD NOT BE THERE &
OF COURSE I GOT BLAMED FOR A NO SHOW & YOU DID NOTHING ABOUT

THAT EITHER. I FEEL I WAS TOTALLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST & YOU
ALLOWED ALL OF THIS TO CONTINUE FOR 4/5 YEARS & IT SHOULD OF
BEEN SETTLED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS. BUT OF COURSE
YOU GOT MORE MONIES THAT WAY. WELL I HOPE YOU WILL DO THE
RIGHT THING AS A PERSON IF NOT AS AN ATTORNEY.
MYRA MARGIS
PO BOX 605
MESQUITE, NV 89024-0605

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, STATE OP UTAH

Myra Margis

.

VS
Bert Lietz

.
.

SCHEDULING ORDER
CASE NO. <\^0<\o 5 ^ 1
JUDGE LESLIE A LEWIS

COUNSEL ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON
4/30/98 AT 10:30 IS HEREBY CONTINUED AND RESCHEDULED FOR 5/7/98 AT
10:00 AM WITH THE HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS. THE COURT HAS SCHEDULED
1/2 HOUR FOR THIS HEARING.
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WILL RESULT IN
PLEADINGS BEING STRICKEN AND A DEFAULT ENTERED. COUNSEL ARE TO
NOTIFY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY, IF THEIR CALENDAR DOES NOT PERMIT
THIS HEARING.

DATED THIS 7TH DAY OF JAN, 1998

CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE
I certify that a copy of the enclosed notice was sent to the
following people by the method and on the date specified.
DATE

METHOD

01/07/98

Mail

01/07/98

Mail

NAME
JEROLD D. MCPHIE
VALLEY TOWER, 10TH FLOOR
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000
NATHAN D. PACE
47 west 200 so, suite 102
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000

(Y^'maM
Deputy Court Clerk

Paae 1 (last)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
:
:

NOTICE OF
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

:

Case No: 940905177 CV

:
::

Judge:
Date:

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,
VS.

BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

LESLIE LEWIS
May 1 3 , 1 9 9 8

PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 08/14/1998
Time: 04:00 p.n.
Location: Fourth Floor - N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS
HEARING AND ARE TO BE PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND
ISSUES IN CONFLICT.
IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE
WILL BE SCHEDULED.
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM JUST IN THE CASE.
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY" TO SETTLE THE LAWSUIT MUST
BE PRESENT.
Dated this \ "b

day of

,py> a v\

.,

C

«<&_•

LESLIE IiEWIS'
Distric

Page 1

Case No: 940905177
Date:
May 13, 1998
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 940905177 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail
Mail

Dated this Q\

day of

NAME
JEROLD D.
336 SOUTH
SALT LAKE
NATHAN D.
136 SOUTH
SUITE 404
SALT LAKE

\r{~)ru)L

MCPHIE
300 EAST SUITE 200
CITY, UT 841112504
PACE
MAIN
CITY

UT 841010000

19_Qjg_.

ty
Deputy

StQL

ourt Clerk

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court at 801-238-7391 at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
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NATHAN D. PACE, (6626)
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
AND TO STRIKE ANSWER
AND ENTER JUDGMENT

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 940905177CV

v.

BERT LIETZ,
Judge: Leslie Lewis

Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Nathan D. Pace, and hereby moves
the Court for an Order holding the Defendant in Contempt for failing to comply with the
previously entered settlement stipulation before the Court, and if the Defendant fails to appear at
the August 14, 1998 pretrial conference and otherwise comply with the Court order of holding
meaningful settlement discussions prior to that Conference, that the Court should Strike
defendant's answer and enter a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff in this case.
Plaintiff requests this motion be heard and argued by parties before the Court at the
Pretrial scheduled for August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm.

1

The Parties previously came before the Court and prior to trial entered into and agreed to
a stipulated settlement which was placed on the record by the Court and approved by the Court.
Among the terms and as part of that stipulation, the Defendant was required to deliver the sum
of $900.00 to the plaintiff and make an accounting of the items taken from the Plaintiff. The
parties met at an appointed time to deliver the items to the Plaintiff and the delivered items were
inventoried by Counsel for Plaintiff. Defendant handed counsel for Plaintiff a check for $900.00
at that time. Counsel for Plaintiff requested that Defendant initial the inventory list when the
delivery was completed, Defendant refused.

When counsel again requested that he initial the

inventory list, Defendant ripped the $900.00 check from counsel for Plaintiffs hand, and drove
away in his truck, nearly running over Plaintiff.
Several times during the ensuing months, Counsel for Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendant
would discuss this matter. Counsel for Defendant would state that he was having a hard time
communicating with his client, but that he would get him to redeliver the check as previously
agreed to.

However the check has never been delivered. As such, since the Defendant has

shown a complete unwillingness to comply with the previous and what was intended to be a final
stipulation and order of the Court regarding this matter, the Plaintiff moves the Court to hold the
Defendant in Contempt for failing to Comply.
Further, the Court has ordered the parties appear on August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm for a
pretrial conference and to have held meaningful discussions as to settlement prior to that date.
Counsel for Plaintiff believes that neither defendant nor Counsel for Defendant will attend nor will
2

they participate in discussions prior to the hearing. If Defendant's do not participate in good faith
settlement discussions and if they do not attend the August 14, 1998 hearing, Plaintiff moves the
Court to strike the Defendant's Answer in this matter and immediately enter a default judgment
for the Plaintiff according to the terms contained in Plaintiffs complaint.
Plaintiff should not be continually punished for Defendant's unwillingness to abide by the
previous Order of the Court.
Plaintiff further asks the Court to order Defendant to pay to Plaintiff an award of $2,500
in attorneys fees in this matter which represent 20 hours at $125.00 which has been a more than
reasonable amount of fees charged in thi^na^tter to date by Counsel for Plaintiff.
DATED THIS

L \/

day cX/RffV/ ~~

1998.

'Nafhan/D. Pace
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF-SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this Ji_day of/ /

/

/ 1998, I had a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Motion sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Jerold D. Mcphee
336 South 300 East #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

3
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
2

MARGIS,

Plaintiff,

*

HEARING

THE COURT:

Okay.

Tnis is Margis or Margis

vs. Lietz.

4

MR. PACE:

5

THE CCURT:

Yes.
Oicay.

And we appear to have

6 some people here but not everybody here.
vs.

*

Case No.

94C905177

7

MR. PACE:

8 Margis.

I don't have any idea.

We have Nathan Pace for Myra
I will tell the

9 Court this, that I have called Mr. McPhie's office a

LIETZ,

10 number of times, I've actually filed a document witn
Defendant.

11

*

the Court, I think, the Court has a copy of that

12 Notice of Intent to Attempt to Enter Settlement

» * ** *

13 Negotiations.

I mailed that to m s office at the end

14 of July listing every single day between tnen and now
15 when I can be available, heard nothing.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of
August, 1998 the Hearing in the above-entitled matter

16

was neld at the above-entitled Court.

17 February saying he was on active duty and not

This Hearing

THE COURT:

Well, we got a letter in

18 scheduled to be back in Salt Lake until early July.

was electronically recorded.

19 I wonder if he's even received notice.
20

MR. PACE:

He —

Well, his —

his law firm

21 is still in business, they're tnere, they're
22 answering the phone.
23

THE COURT:

I know, but I don't know what

24 arrangements he has with them for coverage.
25

Let's do

this, I'd like to see what we can do to resolve this,

Page 2

Page 4

1 and I can put dates in place now, but tnen if he

A P P E A R A N C E S

2 can't live with them he's just going to ask us to
For the Plaintiff:

NATHAN D. PACE

3 reset them, and his client isn't here either.

Attorney at Law

4

Why don't we set this over, Mr. Pace, and

47 West 200 South #102

5 we'll notify him personally and indicate in the

Salt Lake City, UT

6 notice that failure to appear can result in pleadings

84101

7 being stricken or other sanctions, and I'm happy, if
* * * *

1 8

you can prove he received notice, to lacer order

9 fees.
10

MR. PACE:

11 position of —

I understand that, and the

and I have —

in each of the —

I

12 think the Court has noticed this three different

—

13 this year three different times.
14

THE COURT:

15

MR. PACE:

Have we?
I've ~

I've called the Court on

16 behalf of his office saying that I knew he was out of
17 the country.
18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PACE:

Uh huh.
And that's why the Court kept

20 bumping it, and in each one of those notes the Court
21 said if you couldn't come tnen he needed to -- that
22 his —
23
24
25

if r.e didn't come or if he didn't snow up that

the pleading would be stricken.
I do know that his secretary, whoever I was
talking to in the office, said that they had —

I

—

mum-rage
Page 5
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1

they had received the notices from the Court and knew

1 travel, and that is also to be paid before he gets

2

he wasn't going to be back.

2 any opportunity to present a position to this Court.

Rignt now I do know --

3

at least what they're telling me —

4

Missouri.

5

3

is that he's in

I am appalled that he has chosen not to come.

] 4

We are going to try one more time, and on

5 the notice it is going to say the following, it is

But when it comes rignt down to it, what Mr.

5

Lietz is doing is still grossly unfair to my client.

6 going to say that the Plaintiff may appear by phone,

7

We have --

7 she need not appear in this jurisdiction for the next

8
9
10

THE COURT:

Yes.

It is.

9 hearing.

But, you know, in

9

looking at our Notice of Pre-Trial Scheduling

11

MR. PACE:

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Pace, you can appear and your client can

10 appear by phone. And what that means, ma'am, is Mr.

Conference we made a mistake.

11 Pace needs a phone number where we can reach you, and

What's that?

12 you don't have to come back to the State.

It says on it the Court may

You've

13

impose other sanctions, it doesn't say what sanctions

13 come, you've tried. So the next time you don't need

14

and it doesn't say under what circumstances we might

14

to appear, you just need to be available by pnone,

15 and if he comes we'll call you.

15

impose sanctions.

16

appear by either party or counsel can result in

16

17

pleadings being stricken, and it doesn't exactly say

17 the Defendant and/or Counsel, then a bench warrant

18

that, at least on that document.

18 will be issued on the Defendant and — well, what I'm

19

does anywhere else.

20

What it should say is failure to

MR. PACE:

Let me see if it

And if he does not come, and by he I mean

19 going to do is strike the pleadings as well too.
20

In the last one that we received

Michelle, in the notice it is to say exactly

21 this, failure to appear by the Defendant or an

Well, you're right, that one

21

on the 13th of May —

22

does say the Court may impose other sanctions

22 Attorney for the Defendant, and it's an Attorney, and

23

(inaudible).

23 in parenthesis put Mr. McPhie or one of his partners

24
25

THE COURT:

All right.

is order attorneys fees.

24 will result, and will is to be underlined, not may,

What I'm going to do

25 but will result in the Defendant's pleadings being

How much time have you put

1

Page 81
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1 1

in getting ready for this and coming today and in

1 stricken and judgment entered in favor of the

1 2

getting back to your office?

2 Plaintiff.

I 3
1 4

MR. PACE:

Would that include the two

motions that I filed the end of July?

1 5

THE COURT:

Yes.

1 6

MR. PACE:

I 7

$120.00 an hour, including

1 8
1 9

THE COURT:
amount.

Okay.

I would say four hours at

And let me ask you to prepare an order,

3 Mr. Pace, detailing the fees. Yeah.
4

MR. PACE:

5

THE COURT:

Okay.
And, ma'am, I apologize.

6 reason I'm not doing it today is not because you're
7 not entitled to it, because I'm afraid if I struck

—

You're awarded fees in that

Before we proceed with any kind of hearing

8 his pleadings today that they'd just appeal it, and
9 because the notice was not as clear as it might have

beyond a scheduling conference, he's to pay that in

10 been, it would be set aside.

111

full and provide proof of it.

11

J12

work today?

110

113
114

MS. MARGIS:

No.

I came from California

THE COURT:
MS. MARGIS:
THE COURT:
costs were?

19

21

Did you fly in from California?
No.

Ai\d what do you think your gas

Just the gas alone?

Well,

22

the car.

23

husDand miss work?

Well, no, and wear and tear on

What do you think it cost you?

24

KS. MARGIS:

25

THE COURT:

Oorr^ ^ - T>«~~ O

No.

If you had meals on the way, you're entitled

17 if you want to file an affidavit, Mr. Pace,
18 augmenting the 5250.00, which seems very modest to
19 me, she's entitled to receive tnat as well.
20

—
THE COURT:

15

16 to be re-paid for those, so you think about that, and

We drove.

You're entitled to be reimbursed too.

MS. MARGIS:
probably

13 come back, we'll save you another trip, you'll be
14 reimbursed for what you've expended getting here.

15

20

So what I'm trying to do is get you what you

12 need and make sure it sticks. So you don't need to

116

118

Ma'am, did you miss

again.

117

The

Did your

Probably 5250.00.

You're awarded S250.00 in

MR. PACE:

Let me ask her right now if I

21 could for a second.
22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PACE:

Okay.

You bet.

Your Honor, she ~

she was

24 contemplating -- the $250.00 was representing the

I 25

cost of getting here.

She thinks that it's more like

lvuiiu-riige
Page 9
1

a 5500.00 round trip for her

2

THE COURT:

1 ^
5

And she's thinking of gas and

MR. PACE:

Gas and food and motel, she

figured in the motel.
THE COURT:

All right.

Page 11
1

Counsel, in case he isn't here next Friday and you're

2

going to be moving for judgment, all cf those things

3

can be clarified.

4

wear and tear on the vehicle?

a
9

Well, the total round trip.

THE COURT:

6
7

To get back?

MR. PACE:

4

—

I'm going to find

that, unless there is an objection, $500.00 is

MR. PACE:

5

amount that we've plead in the pleadings is

6

sufficient to cover that.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. PACE:

9

10

ordered to be paid.

11

We've been, it seems to me, considerably fair to the

11

I think that's appropriate.

And if we move for judgment the

10

Did that take into account

—

It does.

THE COURT:

-- the fact that none of the

property was operable?
MR. PACE:

It does, because we specifically

12

other side and the point has come where I'm

12

plead for punitive damages on things that weren't

13

disinclined to bend over backwards to accommodate

13

(inaudible) .

14

them any longer.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. MARGIS:

15

So I'll order that and let's hope we can get

Okay.

16

this resolved.

Let me give you a new date right now,

16

returned this this.

17

Mr. Pace, that you can live with, and Mr. McPhie will

17

THE COURT:

18

have to live with it.

18

MS. MARGIS:

19

We just need thirty minutes.

19

THE COURT:

20
21

COURT CLERK:

Michelle, when could we do it?

We could actually do it next

20

Friday at 4:00 o'clock.

22

He took all of this and

Okay.
Eut nothing worked.
And so basically the complaint

asked for the full amount and that's what you'll get.

21

Well, that's pretty quick, and

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. PACE:

22

Yes.

THE COURT:

And your husband looks a little

23

that's what we'll do, the 21st of August at 4:00

23

24

o'clock.

And I'm going to ask this of you, Counsel,

24

MS. MARGIS:

25

I'm going to ask that you prepare the notice and fax

25

THE COURT:

1

it to Mr. McPhie's office on Monday and also mail it

1

that, sir.

2

to him.

2

Take care of yourselves.

discouraged, go buy him a nice dinner.
He's sick.
Oh, he's sick, I'm sorry to hear

Page 10

MR. PACE:

3

5

question about it.

6

MR. PACE:

9
9
10

5

And if he isn't here and/or his

client isn't here, either one of them chooses to

Margis is it?

11

MS. MARGIS:

Margis.

12

THE COURT:

Margis —

13

114
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

122
23

I apologize —

having

MR. PACE:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Anything else that we need to

talk about today?

7

The order —

paid before a case can be presented?

scheduling conference
MR. PACE:

12

14

be

THE COURT:

defenses or issues.

On the stuff that he returned

THE COURT:

to us after that very frightening day that we spent

21

with him at the storage unit, none of it worked.

22

Okay.

Well, I don't want to get

It wouid need to be paid

before a hearing or a trial where they raise any

MR. PACE:

THE COURT:

Right.

16

20

MS. MARGIS:

That that would need to

15

19

You may.

—

Okay.

—

THE COURT:

THE COURT:

—

It does not mean that he

11

MR. PACE:

if it's all right.

Yes.

can't come in, it means that if he gets beyond the

Okay.
Okay.
Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

,23

into that until he's here, but that would be

24

25 something appropriate to handle in an affidavit,
L__

25

24

THE COURT:

10

18

I would like to say something

The

The amount you just ordered has to be

17

MS. MARGIS:

A question on your order.

8

13

to reappear.

Sorry we were not able to

Yes.

MR. PACE:

9

absent themselves, it's a done deal without
Ms. —

THE COURT:
accomplish more.

6

Okay.

I will.

MR. MARGIS:

4

That way there can be no

THE COURT:

7

3

Okay.

THE COURT:

4

Page 12
Well, he still deserves a nice dinner.

1
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*****

Page 2
1

MARGIS,

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PACE:

4
Plaintiff,

*

HEARING

*

Case No.

P R O C E E D I N G S

The Court excused her.

5

THE COURT:

6
vs.

LIETZ,

940905177

7

*

MR. PACE:

*

*****
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of

The other side isn't here.

They

that if they didn't show you would strike their
answer and enter a default judgment.
THE COURT:

I do remember that, Nathan.

Let

11

me note that this was set for 4:00 o'clock, we've

12

given them the grace time of fifteen minutes, it's

13

now 4:17.

14

and relief sought by your client granted is

Your motion to have the pleading stricken

MR. PACE:

16

THE COURT:

was held at the above-entitled Court.

17

electronically recorded.

She's in California.

Where is the other side?

9

15

This Hearing

I represent Myra Margis.

8

August, 1998 the Hearing in the above-entitled matter

was

And who is we?

weren't here last week and the Court issued an order

10
Defendant.

Okay.
Myself.

MR. PACE:

For the record
—

—

—

acceded to.

For the record, the notice that

13

I've submitted to the Court I faxed to them on

19

Monday, as well as mailed, as well as we received the

20

notice from the Court as to this hearing we faxed

21

that as well to them.

22

THE COURT:

You've bent over backwards.

23

Thank you for taking the time to refresh my

24

recollection.

25

wasn't originally on my schedule.

I do remember this, and I'm sorry it
I did have good
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For the Plaintiff:

1

clerks who pulled the file.

2

correct, that is what I said before.

And you're absolutely

NATHAN D. PACE

3

The relief you sought is granted, the Court

Attorney at Law

4

finds, based upon your representation, based upon my

47 West 200 South #102

5

knowledge of the case, notice went out and was

Salt Lake City, UT

6

received, there has been no response either in

7

writing or by virtue of an appearance today.

** * *

84101

8

MR. PACE:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

The amount -I have one person today

apparently I made happy.
MR. PACE:

What else, Mr. Pace?

The amount of the default —

The

12

amount of the judgment should be $67,200.00 as prayed

13

for in the complaint, together with after recurring

14

interest.

15

interest from that date forward.

16

It was filed on May of 1994 and we'd ask

THE COURT:

Now, that I think is

17

problematic.

18

judgment for $67,200.00 and you're entitled to the

19

appropriate interest on that from date of judgment.

20

What is your theory on pre-judgment interest?

21

Certainly you're entitled to have

MR. PACE:

Just, if the pleadings were

22

stricken then —

23

interest pre-judgment reverts back co the date of the

24

filing or from the date of judgment.

k

Just a question as to whether the

THE COURT:

That's a good question.

I could
U o r t o 1 - PdfTA A

Page 5
1

CERTIFICATE

be wrong on this.

2

MR. PACE:

3
4

Page 7 J

I don't know.

THE COURT:

And if you believe I am, you

STATE OF UTAH

*

County of Salt Lake

*

* ss.

could give me legal authority, but that does not

5

strike me as equitable, because there has been, at

6

the very least, a good faith basis for the other side

7

at least believing that this was not going tc result

8

in past interest being accrued.

9

I, MINDY L. NELSON, do hereby certify
that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 6,
contain a true and accurate transcript of the

So in my discretion judgment is entered for

10

the full amount, interest will start to accrue from

electronically recorded proceedings held in

11

this day forward.

connection with Margis vs. Lietz held on August 21,

I'm granting judgment today.

I'll

12

sign the pleadings on Monday if you submit them, and

1998 and was transcribed by me to the best of my

13

I'll date it today's date, because that's when I'm

ability from the cassette tape furnished to me.

14

entering judgment.

15

pre-judgment interest.

16
17

MR. PACE:

Okay.

In the —

Okay.

Thank
Mindy L. Nelson, Transcriber

you, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PACE:

20

Dated this 6th day of April, 2000.

But I am declining to impose

pleading we had requested attorneys fees.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. PACE:

123

THE COURT:

I, RENZE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand

Anything else?
In the pleading we had —

Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary

In the

Public for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that

I —

the foregoing transcript prepared by Mindy L. Nelson

You're entitled to them.

was transcribed under my supervision and direction.

Okay.
Would you provide me with an

24

affidavit delineating the time spent, addressing the

125

issue of reasonableness and necessity, and attach any

I

Renee L. Stacy, CSR, RPR
Commission expires:
Page 6

1 1

billing records you've got that are supportive of the

1 2

same, and I will award a reasonable fee.

3

MR. PACE:

1 4
1 5

THE COURT:
grumpy.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

Sorry I was a little

It's been a very long day.

16

MR. PACE:

I 7

THE COURT:

It sounds like it.
In recess for ten minutes.

8

19
110

11
112
113

114
115
116
117
118
|l9

120
21
22

I23
124
25
•

Paap S - Par** 7

u u u o w i u i

-##102[i] 2:4
-$$67,200.00 [2] 4:12,18

-11 [l] 7:6
1 9 9 4 [l] 4:14
1 9 9 8 [2] 1:9 7:10

-Bbackwards [i] 3:22
b a s e d [2] 4:4,4
b a s i s [i] 5:6
believing[i] 57
b e n t [ i ] 3:22
b e s t [ i ] 7:10
b i l l i n g [i] 6:1

-CC[2] 2:1 3:1

-22 0 0 [l] 2:4
2 0 0 0 [l] 7:12
21 [l] 7:9
2 1 s t [ i ] 1:8

4 7 [l] 2:4
4 : 0 0 [l] 3:11
: 4 : 1 7 m 3:13

-66 [ i ] 7:6
6th [l] 7:12

-884101 [l] 2:5

940905177 m 1:4

ability [i] 7:11
above-entitled [2] 1:9
1:10
absolutely [l] 4:1
acceded [i] 3:16
jaccrueti] 5:10
accrued [i] 5.8
accurate [i] 7:7
addressing [i] 5:24
affidavit [i] 5:24
amount [4] 4:8,11,12
5:10
answer [i] 3:9
appearance [i] 4:7
appropriate [i] 4:19
April [i] 7:12
attach [i] 5:25
Attorney [i] 2:3
attorneys [i] 5:20
August [2] 1:9 7:9
authority [l] 5:4
i award [i] 6:2

California [i] 3:4
c a s e [2] 1:4 4:5

cassette [i] 7:11
Certainly [i] 4:17

,faith[i] 56
f a x e d [2] 3:18,20
f e e [ i ] 6:2
f e e s r i ] 5:20
f i f t e e n [i] 3.12
f i l e [ i ] 4:1
f i l e d [l] 4:14
f i l i n g [l] 4:24
f i n d s [i] 4:4
f o r e g o i n g [2] 7.6,18
f o r w a r d [2] 4:15 5:11
f u l l f i ] 5:10
f u r n i s h e d [i] 7.11

CERTIFICATE [i] 7:1
Certified [i] 7.15
G [ i ] 3:1

certify [2] 7:5,17
Citym 2:5
clerks [i] 4:1
client [i] 3:14
Commission (i] 7:22
complaint [i] 4:13
connection [i] 7:9
contain [i] 7:7
correct [i] 4:2
County [i] 7:4

-G-

g i v e n [l] 3:12
g o o d [3] 3:25 4:25 5:6
g r a c e [l] 3:12
g r a n t e d [2] 3:14 4:3
g r a n t i n g [i] 5:11
g r u m p y [i] 6:5

MarglS[3] 1:2 3:3 7:9
m a t t e r [i] 1:9
M a y [ i ] 4:14
M i n d y [ 3 ] 7:5,14,18
m i n u t e s [2] 3:12 6:7
M o n d a y [2] 3:19 5:12
m o t i o n [i] 3.13
M y r a [ i ] 3:3

-NN [ 2 ] 2:1 3:1
N a t h a n [2] 2:2 3:10

necessity [i] 5:25
Nelson [3] 7:5,14,18
Notary [i] 7.16
noteci] 3:11
n o t i c e [3] 3:17,20 4:5
n o w [2] 3:13 4:16

recorded [2] 1:12 7:8
records [i] 6:1
recurring [i] 4:13
refresh [i] 3:23
Registered [i] 7:16
relief"[2]
[ 3:14 4:3
remember[2] 3:10,24
REMEMBERED m
1:8
R e n e e p ] 7:15,21
Reporter [2] 7:16,16
represent [i] 3:3
representation [i] 4:4
requested [i] 5:20
response [i] 4:6
result [i] 5:7
reverts [i] 4:23
RPR[i] 7:21

numbered[i] 76

S[2] 2:1 3:1
Salt [2] 2:5 7:4
0 [ i ] 3:1
schedule [i] 3:25
O ' c l o c k [l] 3:11
set[i] 3:11
o n e [ i ] 4:9
Shorthand [i] 7.15
order [i] 3:7
s h o w [ i ] 3.8
originally [i] 3:25
-Hs i d e [3] 3:5,6 5:6
h a p p y c i ] 4:10
s i g n m 5:12
-Plhearing[4] 1:3,9,10 3:20
S o n y [2] 3:24 6:4
h e l d [3] 1:10 7:8,9
P[3] 2:1,1 3:1
SOUght [2] 3:14 4:3
h e r e b y [2] 7:5,17
P a c e [15] 2:2 3:3,6,15,17 s o u n d s [l] 6:6
4:8,10,11,21 5:2,16,19,22
j H o n o r [2] 5:17 6:3
S o u t h [l] 2:4
CSR[1] 7:21
6:3,6
Spent [l] 5:24
p a g e s [l] 7:6
-ISS[i] 7:3
-Dp a s t [ i ] 5:8
i m p o s e [ i ] 5:14
S t a c y [2] 7:15,21
p e r s o n [i] 4:9
D [2] 2:2 3:1
i n t e r e s t [8] 4:14,15,19
start [i] 5:10
date [6] 4:15,19,23,24
P l a i n t i f f [2] 1:3 2.2
4:20,23 5:8,10,15
State [2] 7:2,17
5:13,13
p l e a d i n g [3] 3:13 5:19 i s s u e [i] 5:25
I stricken [2] 3:13 4:22
D a t e d [i] 7:12
5:20
i s s u e d [i] 3:7
d e c l i n i n g [i] 5:14
p l e a d i n g s [2] 4:21 5:12 Strike [2j 3:8 5:5
s u b m i t [ij 5:12
d e f a u l t [2] 3:9 4:11
p r a y e d [i] 4.12
-JD e f e n d a n t [i] 1:6
p r e - j u d g m e n t [3] 4:20 submitted [i] 3:18
judgment
[8]
3:9
4:12
s u p e r v i s i o n [i] 7:19
d e l i n e a t i n g [i] 5:24
4:23 5:15
4:18,19,24 5:9,11,14
supportive [i] 6:1
d i r e c t i o n [i] 7:19
p r e p a r e d [l] 7:18
d i s c r e t i o n [i] 5.9
p r o b l e m a t i c [i] 4.17
-Kp r o c e e d i n g s [i] 7:8
knowledge [i] 4:5
-EP r o f e s s i o n a l [i] 7:16
taking [i] 3:23
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
[i]
5:23
tape[i] 7:11
E[4] 2:1,1 3:1,1
-LP
u
b
l
i
c
[i]
7:17
ten[i) 6:7
e i t h e r [i] 4:6
L[5]
7:5,14,15,18,21
p
u
l
l
e
d
[i]
4.1
Thank [4] 3:23 5:16 6:3
I e l e c t r o n i c a l l y [2] 1.12
L a k e [2] 2:5 7:4
6:4
I 7:8
-Rl a s t [ i ] 3:7
theory [ij 4:20
enter [i] 3:9
L a W [ i ] 2:3
R[2] 2:1 3:1
through [l] 7:6
entered [i] 5:9
reasonable [i] 6:2
l e a s t [2] 5:6,7
today [3] 4:7,9 5:11
entering fi] 5:14
reasonableness
[i]
5:25
l
e
g
a
l
[i]
5:4
today's [i] 5:13
entitled [3] 4:17,18 5:21
received
[2]
3:19
4:6
together [i] 4:13
L
i
e
t
z
[
2
]
1:5
7:9
equitable [i] 5.5

excused [i] 3:4
[expires [i] 7:22

-M- ~
m a i l e d [i] 3.19

-O-

recess m 6:7
recollection [i] 3:24
record [2] 3:15,17

transcribed [2] 7:10,19
Transcriber [i] 7:14
transcript [2] 7:7,18
T « / 4 D V Parr**

true [i] 7 7

-uundei [l] 7 19
UT[i] 2 5
Utahi 2] 7 2,17

-Vvirtue [i] 4 7
VS [2] 1 4 7 9

-wweek[i] 3 7
i West [i] 2 4
[wnting [i] 4 7
wrong [i] 5 1

Index Page 2

D F P O M A Y U P P O P T l x m T T / ~ * / o m \ ->">o n o o

3ALtvG*K£ COUhTY

3y
uflpjjt^iolerf.r'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MYRA MARGIS,

COURT'S RULING

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 940905177

vs.
BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

The Court has before it several Notices to Submit, filed
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration/
in

connection with

defendant's Motion

to

Strike

Plaintiff's

Pleading from 10 October 2000 through Present, defendant's Motion
to Quash and Recall Garnishment and Motion to Enlarge Time and the
plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order.

The Court has carefully

considered each of these Motions and has also thoroughly reviewed
the file in this matter.
It appears that this matter came "before the Court for a pretrial conference on June 14, 1996.

According to the Minutes for

this conference, the parties indicated to the Court that they had
reached a stipulation.

The stipulation was read into the record

and the trial date was stricken.

Counsel for the plaintiff was

instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case based on the
stipulation.

COURT'S RULING
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In response to a letter written to the Court by the plaintiff,
dated November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30,
1998 •

For unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing

was ever held.

Instead, because an Order of dismissal was never

prepared, the Court scheduled a pretrial/scheduling conference for
August 14, 1998.

The Minutes for the August 14, 1998, hearing,

indicate that the defendant and his counsel, Mr. McPhie, failed to
appear.

The Court granted the plaintiff attorneyfs fees and

travel costs, totaling $98 0.

The hearing was then re-scheduled

for August 21, 1998, with a warning from the Court that if Mr.
McPhie or one of his associates failed to appear again, the
defendant's pleading would be stricken and judgment entered against
him.
On August 21, 1998, Mr. McPhie again failed to appear and the
Court granted the plaintiff's request to strike the defendant's
Answer and enter judgment in her favor.

The judgment amount

granted was $67,200, together with interest to accrue from the date
of the hearing. Attorney's fees were also granted.

The Order and

Judgment was entered on August 28, 1998.
On September 2, 1998, the defendant filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and Attorney's Fees.

The basis for this Motion was

that Mr. McPhie had been on military duty during the time that the
two hearings were scheduled and was unable to attend.

From the

MARGIS V. LIETZ
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point that the defendant filed this Motion to Set Aside, the record
becomes more confusing because the file contains motions filed on
behalf of the defendant by Mr, McPhie, by a Mr. Ziter (who entered
an appearance of counsel

on

September

defendant himself on a pro

se basis.

28, 1999) and by the

It appears that Mr. Ziter

eventually withdrew as defendant's counsel and was replaced by the
defendant's original attorney, Mr. McPhie. However, throughout the
time of his representation by both counsel, the defendant was also
submitting his own motions and pleadings, including a Motion to
Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal, discussed below.
On December 18, 2000, the Court considered the defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and denied it. An Order denying the
Motion was entered contemporaneously.
On February 6, 2001, the defendant filed a second Motion and
Memorandum to Set Aside Order and Rule on Outstanding Motions.
This Motion essentially asks the Court to clarify the record by
ruling on the defendant's Motion

to

Strike

(the plaintiff's

response to the original Motion to Set Aside as untimely), Motion
to Release Funds and defendant's Objection to the plaintiff's
proposed Order.

It should have been clear to the defendant when

the Court entered the plaintiff's proposed Order on December 18,
2000, that the defendant's Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and
Objection were also being denied.

However, to clarify the record,

COURTfS RULING
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the Court now rules that although it was not expressly stated, the
Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and Objection were indeed
denied upon the Court's entry of the December 18, 2000, Order.
On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal
that was filed by the defendant on a pro

se

basis.

The Court

entered this Order on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it
appeared to reflect the reality that the parties reached an accord
and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996, hearing before the
Court.

However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike

Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the
events that transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and with
the existing Judgment and Order already entered by the Court on
August 28, 1998.

The Court now determines that the Order of

Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and Order.

In

addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever
reached

an

accord

and

satisfaction

because

a

formal

Order

dismissing the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was
never prepared and entered.

Accordingly, the Court grants the

plaintiff's Motion to Strike and vacates the Order of Dismissal
entered on March 14, 2 001.

Furthermore, the defendant's Motion to

MARGIS V. LIETZ
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Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is based on the nowvacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied,1
Finally, the Court considers the defendant's Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Pleadings from 10 October 2000.

While the plaintiff

has apparently mailed certain of her pleadings to an incorrect
address for the defendant, striking the plaintiff's pleadings is
too harsh a remedy, particularly where it does not appear that the
defendant has been prejudiced by this mistake.

Plaintiff is to

ensure that she corrects her mailing address for the defendant for.
all future filings.

The defendant's Motion to Strike is denied.

In future if the defendant is represented by counsel, any
motions should be filed by counsel.
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this r ^

day of August, 2001.

H
LESLIE A. LEWI'S *
DISTRICT COURT\JUDGE

1

To clarify the record, in light of the Court's decision to vacate the Order of Dismissal,
the defendant's Motion to Quash and related Motion to Enlarge Time are moot. However, in the
interest of justice, the Court granted the Motion to Enlarge and considered the defendant's latefiled Reply to the plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the
foregoing

Court's Ruling,

to the

following,

this

August, 2001:

Nathan D. Pace
David S. Pace
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 S. Main, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jerold D. McPhee
Attorney for Defendant
320 South 3 00 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-2537

\

r

day of

V

Y\

^ U '
DAVID PACE (8252)
NATHAN D. PACE. P.C. (6626)
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,

MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER
'Plaintiff,

V.

Civil No. 940905177 CV
BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Judge: Lewis

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, by and through Counsel, and hereby moves the court
that the Order of Dismissal signed by the Court on March 14, 2001, be stricken from the record
or corrected. Pursuant to URCP R. 60 (a), Plaintiff believes that this Order of Dismissal was
signed as a clerical mistake, or that it requires clarification to reflect the Court's intent. In the
alternative. Plaintiff believes that the Order of Dismissal should be set aside pursuant to URCP R.
60(4) or (6), as being void or (for clarification) as any other reason justifying relief. This motion
is brought within a reasonable time. The attached Memorandum of Points is provided in support.
DATED this July ]X 2001.

By: I

y.

David hJTPace
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of foregoing
MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER to the following by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on July
2001, at:
Jerold D. McPhee .
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2504
ph. (801) 322-1616
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DAVID PACE (8252)
NATHAN D. PACE, P.C. (6626)
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 940905177 CV

v.

Judae: Lews

BERTLIETZ.
Defendant.

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, by anc through Counsel, and hereby submits this
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her Motion to Strike Order, concerning an
Order of Dismissal signed by the Court on March 14. 2001
FACTS REGARDING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
1.

The Order of Dismissal was never the subject of any Motion to Submit ever filed with the
Court.

2.

Defendant submitted the Order to the Court pro se although he has continually been
represented by counsel, and was represented by Counsel at the time.

-1-

3.

The Order was signed by the Court on March 14, 2001, and the accompanying certificate
of sendee was filed on March 12, 2001. (attached)

4.

The time differential of the filing and signing of this order indicates that regardless of
notice, Plaintiff was given no opportunity to review7 or object to the contents of the Order.

5.

No Rule 4-504 notice is attached to the Order or reflected in any Court Filing.

6.

Plaintiff or Counsel never received any copy of a proposed order despite the mailing
certificate.

7.

Plaintiffs Counsel did not receive any actual notice that this Order had been submitted to
or signed by the Court until delivered by Defendant's attorney as part of a Motion to
Quash Garnishment (attached) which was received on July 9. 2001.

8.

The Third District Court Clerk still lists a judgment being in effect for this case, entered on
August 28,1998, in the amount of $70,180.00.
FACTS REGARDING CASE HISTORY

9.

The Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, addresses a settlement agreement heard
by the court on June 14, 1996.

10.

The Defendant's noncompliance with the settlement agreement of June 14, 1996. was the
subject matter of the hearings to be addressed by the Court on August 14, 1998, and
August 21,1998, as requested by Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt and to Strike .Answer
and Enter Judgment, which was filed on July 31, 1998. (attached)

.?.

The hearings on August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, were attended by neither the
Defendant nor Counsel for Defendant.
Defendant's .Answer was stricken and Judgment was entered against him on August 28,
1998, as sanctions for non-appearance at the hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21,
1998.
On September 2, 1998, Defendant through his attorney, filed a Motion to set aside the
judgment, wrhich the Court had previously ruled would not be heard until Defendant
tendered $980.00 in costs and attorney fees to the Court.
On October 8, 1998. the Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's motion to set aside the
judgment.
On October 15, 1998, Defendant, through his attorney, filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs
response to Defendant's motion to set aside.
Defendant tendered court-ordered sanctions of S980.00 to the Court on October 5, 2001,
which the Court had ordered to be a prerequisite to any further rulings on the case.
On October 6, 2001, Defendant, through his attorney, filed a notice to submit on his
motion to set aside the judgment and his motion to strike Plaintiffs response.
On November 15, 2001, based on Defendant's Notice to Submit, the Court denied
Defendant's Motion to set aside the judgment, and ordered that the Judgment would
remain in effect, (attached)

On November 24, 2000, Defendant, through his attorney, submitted a Proposed Order
reflecting the Court's denial of Defendant's motion to set aside judgment, and the Plaintiff
filed an objection to the Defendant's proposed Order on December 4, 2000.
On December 4, 2000, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Order reflecting the Court's denial
of Defendant's Motion to set aside Judgment, and the Defendant, through counsel, filed an
objection to Plaintiffs proposed order on December 11, 2000.
On December 19, 2000, the Court apparently reviewed both Proposed Orders and both
sets of Objections, and the Court signed the Plaintiffs proposed Order reflecting the
Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment.
In addition, on December 4, 2000. Plaintiff filed a motion to release funds held by the
Court, to which Defendant through counsel, filed an objection on December 11, 2000.
On December 18, 2000, the court executed the Plaintiffs proposed Order Releasing
Funds.
On February 2, 2001, Defendant, through Counsel, filed a notice to submit for decision on
Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Response, Defendant's Proposed Order regarding
the Defendant's Motion to set aside judgment, Plaintiffs Objection to same, Plaintiffs
Motion for Release of Funds, Defendant's Opposition to same, and Defendant's Objection
to Plaintiffs Proposed Order regarding Defendant's Motion to set aside Judgment.
(attached)
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25.

None of these motions or orders had any relation to the Order to Dismiss filed with the
court by the Defendant, pro se, on March 12. 2001, and signed on March 14, 2001.

26.

The Third District Court Clerk's log indicates that the Notice to Submit of February 2,
2001, was delivered to the Court for Decision on March 12, 2001.

27.

While several of the orders and motions referenced in Plaintiffs Notice to Submit of
February 2,2001. appear to have previously been decided by the Court, the Order of
Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001, does not address any of the issues contained in the
motions and orders contained in the notice to submit.

28.

A valid Writ of Garnishment to First Security Bank was issued by the Court on 10 April
2001 and served on 12 April 2001, without objection by Defendant.

29.

A valid Writ of Garnishment to America First Credit Union was issued by the Court on 26
June 2001 and served on 28 June 2001.

30.

Defendant, by counsel, filed a Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment on 5 July
2001, based on the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective June 14, 1996.

31.

Plaintiffs Counsel first received actual notice or knowledge of Defendant's Order of
Dismissal signed March 14,2001, effective June 14, 1996, as an addendum to Defendant's
Motion to Quash Garnishment, which was received on July 9, 2001.
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ARGUMENT

THE ORDER OF MARCH 14, 2001, APPEARS TO BE SIGNED AS A CLERICAL ERROR
BY THE COURT, AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a)

Even though a valid Judgment remains in place against Defendant, Plaintiff believes that
the Order of Dismissal wTas signed as a mistake or clerical error by the Court. On February 2.
2001, Defendant's Counsel submitted a Notice to Submit encompassing seven different
procedural motions, objections, and orders. Court records indicate that on March 12, 2001. the
Notice to Submit was delivered to Judge Lewis for ruling, on the same day that Defendant pro se
filed a totally separate Order of Dismissal with the Court. Plaintiffs counsel never received a
copy of this order or was given any opportunity to respond to the order. On March 1*4, 2001. at
most two days after being filed, that Order of Dismissal was signed by the Court, although it was
never the subject of any Notice to Submit or other Motion before the court.
URCP 60(a) allows that clerical mistakes in "orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight.. .may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or
on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any. as the court orders." As a clerical error
or mistake, the signed Order of Dismissal should be stricken by the Court immediately. The
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Court should require that Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion, with an
opportunity for response by Plaintiff, before being considered for signature by the Court.

THE SUBSTANCE OF DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS SET ASIDE BY THE
COURT WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT ON AUGUST 285
1998, FOR NON-APPEARANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. AN ACCORD WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT. BUT
NOT SATISFACTION. PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a), THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE OR
CORRECT THE ORDER TO PREVENT THE APPEARANCE OF A MISTAKE IN THE
RECORD

URCP 60(a) provides that clerical errors in orders may be corrected at any time. A
Clerical amendment to an order "is one which is intended to make the judgment speak the truth by
showing what the judicial action really wras..." Richards v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314,471 P.2d
143 (Utah 1970). A clerical error is not a "judicial errors"; A clerical amendment cannot correct a
judicial decision by ''making [a judgment] express something which the court did not pronounce,
and did not intend to pronounce, in the first instance." Richards. Plaintiff submits that the
Defendant's Order of Dismissal does not accurately reflect the actual rulings of the Court, and as
such should be stricken or corrected.
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The Defendant's Order of Dismissal decrees that "the parties did reach an accord and
satisfaction in this matter." The record of the hearing on June 14,1996, indicates that while the
Court recognized that an agreement for settlement was reached (an accord), satisfaction of that
agreement was never provided. The extensive proceedings following that hearing, and the
Court's eventual entering of Judgment against the Defendant on August 28, 1998, are the result
of the Court's actual determination that the Defendant had not complied with or provided
satisfaction to that settlement agreement and subsequent court orders.
Quickly addressing the content of Defendant's Order of Dismissal, the Order is based on a
settlement agreement made in Court on June 14,1996. Defendant's noncompliance with the
settlement agreement was the subject of Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt filed July 31,1998. In
the Motion, Plaintiff submitted to the Court that Defendant ripped the settlement check from
Plaintiffs attorney's hand and drove away, nearly running knocking down Plaintiffs attorney
Nathan Pace with his truck. For the next two years Defendant refused to redeliver the check or
participate in attempts to comply with the settlement agreement. The Motion for Contempt was
scheduled for hearing on August 14,1998, and August 21,1998. Defendant's nonappearance at
the Court hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, was the basis for Judgment being
entered against him. Judgment was entered against Defendant on August 28,1998, as sanctions
for non-compliance with the settlement agreement addressed in Defendant's Order of Dismissal.
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Defendant's Order of Dismissal states that an accord and satisfaction was completed on
June 14, 1996. While an initial settlement agreement was reached in court, Satisfaction was never
delivered. Defendant did not comply with the settlement agreement or with further court orders.
As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, Defendant's Answer was stricken and judgment
wras entered against him. As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, the settlement agreement
and the potential dismissal of the case was voided. While an order could be entered reflecting the
court hearing of June 14, 1996, the Order of Dismissal does not clearly reflect the status of this
case. The Order should reflect that notwithstanding the settlement agreement, Judgment wTas
entered against Plaintiff on August 28,1998. To correct the appearance of an oversight in the
record, the Court should strike the Defendant's Order of Dismissal or correct it to reflect that
Judgment was subsequently entered against Defendant. URCP 60(a) again provides that the
Court may make this correction at any time of its own initiative.

DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14, 2001, SHOULD BE STRICKEN
AS BEING VOID PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(4)

The Order of Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001, indicates that this case was dismissed
effective 14 June 1996. Notwithstanding a settlement agreement being reached on that date, the
Defendant's answer was subsequently stricken by the Court and Judgment was entered against
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him on August 28, 1998. As such the dismissal referred to in Defendant's Order of Dismissal is
void and should be stricken from the record by the Court.

DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14, 2001, SHOULD BE STRICKEN
OR AMENDED IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE STATUS OF THE COURT'S ORDERS, AS
"ANY OTHER REASON" PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(6)

This Court entered Judgment against the Defendant on August 28,1998, even though the
parties had previously reached a settlement agreement. While the Third District Court Clerk's
record still accurately reflects that a valid judgment has been entered against the Defendant, the
presence of an Order of Dismissal in the record effective two years prior to the Entry of Judgment
creates the possibility of confusion regarding the Court's orders. The Defendant has filed a
motion to quash a valid garnishment based on this Order of Dismissal. In the event that the Court
does not seek to clarify this as a clerical matter under URCP 60(a), the Court should clarify the
order under the authority of URCP 60(b)(6).
"A Motion for 'Clarification of Judgment' is not specifically provided for in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the substance of the motion is to make clear a judgment that
it is not already clear. If the clarity of the judgment is called into question because the opposing
party is improperly applying the judgment, then implicit in the motion is a request to change the

-10-

judgment to provide relief to a party harmed by the lack of clarity. Accordingly, we hold that in
the case before us, appellees motion for clarification, in which appellants joined, was sufficient to
invoke Rule 60(b)." Kunzler v. O'delL 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 855 P.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1993).
"A court may grant relief under subsection seven [six] of Rule 60(b) for any reason other
than the first six [five] enumerated by the rule if relief is justified, and the motion is made within a
reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. Inc.. 817 P.2d
382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). Kunzler v. O'delL Plaintiff does not claim "(1) Mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;" as the basis of this 60(b) motion because the
Judgment entered against Defendant on August 28,1998, has correctly not been affected by the
Order of Dismissal. Two valid garnishments have been issued by the Court subsequent to the
Defendant's Order of Dismissal, one on April 10, 2001, and one on June 26, 2001. This motion is
also not based on "(3) fraud." This 60(b)(6) motion is for the purpose of clarifying the Court's
Record concerning this Order of Dismissal, so that it remains clear to Court personnel or other
judges evaluating the validity of writs of garnishment that a valid Judgment has been entered and
affirmed by this court (on November 15, 2001), despite the entry of dismissal at a prior date.
For greatest clarity of the record the Order of Dismissal should be stricken, with a new
Order prepared which clearly describes the record of this Case. The Court should require that
Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion, with an opportunity for response by
Plaintiff, before being considered for signature by the Court. In the alternative the Court should
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correct the Order to reflect that despite the previous settlement agreement a Judgment was
subsequently entered against Defendant.
TIMELINESS
Relief under URCP 60 (a) may be sought "at any time/" Relief under URCP 60 (4) or (6)
must be sought within "a reasonable time.*' The Court has issued two valid garnishments since
the entry of the Order of Dismissal. Defendant has created an apparent need for clarification of
the Order of Dismissal only in the last ten days by filing a Motion to Quash the latest Writ of
Garnishment. This motion is filed four months after the Order was signed, and less than one week
after Plaintiff first received actual notice of the Order of Dismissal. No party has been prejudiced
to this point in the passage of time from the signing of the Order of Dismissal. This motion is
timely.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING RELIEF:
1.

That pursuant to URCP 60(a), as a clerical error or mistake, the Order of Dismissal signed
March 14, 2001, effective June 14, 1996, should be stricken by the Court immediately.
The Court should require that Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion,
with an opportunity for response by Plaintiff, before being entered by the Court.

2.

That pursuant to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, the
Court should strike the Defendant's Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective
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June 14,1996, or correct it to reflect that Judgment was subsequently entered against

3.

That pursuant to URCP 60(b)(4), the dismissal referred to in Defendant's Order of
Dismissal is void and should be stricken from the record by the Court.

4.

That pursuant to URCP 60(b)(6), to clarify the Judgment entered in this case and avoid
the appearance of #n oversight in the record, the Court should strike the Defendant's
Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective June 14. 1996, or correct it to reflect
that Judgment was subsequently entered against Defendant
DATED this July/£ 2001.

By: (_^^

j

Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER to the following by
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on July jX 2001, at:
3eto\QD.McP,nee
336 South 300 East Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2504
ph. (801) 322-1616
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BERT LIETZ
4901 SOUTH LAURA DRIVE
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICTPCOURT:~ :<
IN AND FOR S.ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

MYRA MARGIS,
PLAINTIFF,
CASE NUMBER: g9C9099C2€SLV.JUDGE LESLIE .A LEWIS
BERT LIETZ,
DEFENDANT.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3Y PERSONAL SERVICE
[ORDER OF DISMISSAL (16 JUNE 1996)]
I certify thai on this l^-~

day of March 2001,1 personally placed a true and

correct copy of the "Order of Dismissal referencing the court decision on 16 June-1996,"
in a sealed envelope. I further certify that the same was placed in the United States Postal
System, postage prepaid and addressed to the following:
Natha Pace
136 South Main Street, Suite 404
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101

FSL59 3SSTWST COURT
Tftirc" J'-'cicis.! District
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BERTLIETZ
4901 SOUTH LAURA DRIVE
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
(801)268-1436

IN THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

MYRA MARGIS,
PLAINTIFF,

}
} CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV

V.

}

BERT LIETZ,

} JUDGE LESLIE A, LEWIS

DEFENDANT.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter came before the coun on 14 June 1996; her counsel Nathan Pace
reoresented the siaintin, while his anomev. Jerold McPhee. represented the defendant.
The parties reached an accord and satisfaction relating to this matter and agreed to this
action being dismissed. The foBowing facts are provided for the coun:
On 14 June 1996 the parties reached an accord and satisfaction, as follows:
"Mr. Lietz will return to Myra Margis all bingo equipment
taken from the Carousel Club, as well as any other
personal property of any - * either Mrs. Margis or any of
the people who were there, the patrons of the carousel
Mr. Lietz will make no claim on the automobiles that
secure Mr. Margis' debt to him. Both parties sign the
mutual release of all claims against the either party and
there will be the mutual restraining order in effect between
the parties."'
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Order of Dismissal
Civil Number: 9-^0905177CV
Plaintiff: MyraMargis
Defendant: Ben Lietz

The coun questioned the panies relating to the above accord and satisfaction, both
parties acknowledged their acceptance.

The coun then accepted the accord and

satisfaction and order Mr. Pace to prepare the paperwork for dismissal A copy of the
transcript is incorporated and marked Embit UA.~ Also provided is a copy of the money
order, which is bcorporated and marked as Exhibit "3."' A statement relating to the
return of the propeny was previously filed with the coun.
Therefore, the defendant has complied with the accord and has satisfied the matter
and the maner was thusly dismissed.
Plaintiffs anorney was ordered during this hearing to prepare and submit the
necessary paperwork to dismiss this action, he failed to. This was a willful and deliberate
violation on Mr. Pace's pan. because the coun clearly ordered him to do it and the rules
of judicial Administration. Rule —504 requires it. His failure is a clear contempt of the
courts order and will be made an issue separately on an order to show cause. The
following is the couns own words:
I will allow you. then. Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents
concerning dismissal.
Mr. Pace the acknowledge the couns order by stating. "That's fine."
The defendant has taken it upon himself to prepare the paperwork and is
submitting it for signature.
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Order of Dismissal
Civil Number: 940905177CV
Plaintiff: MyraMargis
Defendant: Bert Lietz

Therefore, the court after reviewing the defendant's dismissal and a full review of
transcript and other documents provided, and the court record and upon good cause
appearing the court orders the following:
It is hereby adjudged decreed, and ordered that:
1. The parties did reach an accord and satisfaction in this matter. Furthermore.
the court, in open court and on the record accepted the accord and satisfaction as
represented and accepted by both parties.
2. Once the court accepted the settlement agreement the court ordered the case to
be dismissed and order the plaintiffs attorney to prepare the documents for its dismissal.
Clearly from the record the plaintiffs attorney failed to comply with this courts order.
3. The effective date of dismissal is 14 June 1996.
Therefore, this action is dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996.
Dated this

' / aav of March 2001.

Exhibit "A"

IN TH3 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

^oMr)pTr

IN AND POP. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE « „ «

"

MYRA MARGIS

vs

CASS NO. S40S05177C V

= S R T LIETZ
Defendant

di?ORS THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

'ORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OR PROCEEDINGS

JUNE 14 13 9 6

REPORTED BY:

Kathleen Schultz, CSR

E A R A N C E S

FOR

!E PLAINT
NATHAN D. PACE
PACE, 3R0ADHEAD & NICKLS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
47 west 200 South, No. 102
Salt Lake City, UT S4101
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, Kathleen Sehultz, an Official

Court

Reporter for the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that I reported the above - entitled matter on
June 14, 1955, and that the preceding pages 1 through
9, inclusive, comprise a true and correct Reporter's
Transcriot of Proceedincs.

Dated this 27th day of Seoterr.ber, 1399

C. 3.R.
rkiatnj.een Senuitt
Official Court Reoortsr

Jerold D. McPhee (3662)
Anomey for the Defendant
320 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2537
Telephone: 801.322.1616

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

Case Number: 940905177 CV

vs.

BERT LIETZ.

Judse: Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

MOTION TO QUASH AND RECALL WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
Comes now the Defendant, Bert Lietz, who, by and through his attorney of record, Jerold D.
McPhee, hereby moves this Court for its order quashing and recalling the Writ of Garnishment,
which was inappropriately applied for by the Plaintiff and erroneously issued by this Court on 26
June 2001.
In support there of the Defendant shows this Court that this matter was dismissed with
prejudice on March 14,2001 effective June 14,1996. The attached Memorandum of Points is herein
provided in support of this Motion.
///

\\\

///

\\\

Dated this C> day of July 2001.
Respectfully Submitted,

Jefold D. McPhee
Xitomev for the Defendant
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebv certifv that a true and correct cocv of the fore2oins MOTION TO QUASH AND
RECALL WRIT OF GARNISHMENT was mailed, first class postage thereon prepaid, this S "~
day of July, 2001. to:
Nathan D. Pace and David Pace
136 South Main Street, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,

NOTICE OF
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

Plaintiff,

VS.
•aTPfT1

T,T"-"T"7

Defendant.

PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE i s
Date: 03/14/1993
Time: 04:00 p . n .

Case No:

9 4 0 9 0 5 1 7 7 CV

Judge:
Dare:

LESLIE LEWIS
May 1 3 , 1 9 S 3

scheduled.

Location: Fourth Floor - N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATS
SLC, UT 84111-1860
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS
HEARING AND ARE TO 3E PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND
ISSUES IN CONFLICT.
IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE
WILL BE SCHEDULED.
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO OPPOSING FARTIE3, AS MAY SEEM JUST IN THE CASE.
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY "TO SETTLE TEE LAWSUIT MUST
BE PRESENT.
Dated this \^. day oi

o
LESLIE EEWIS'j^
Distric

Case No: 940905177
Date:
May 13, 1998
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case S40905177 by the method and on the data
specified.
METHOD
Kail
Mail

Dated this -Q\ dav of

NAME
JERCLD D.
336 SOUTH
SALT LAKE
NATHAN D.
13 6 SOUTH
SUITE 4 04
SALT LAKE
, 19

i/^v \ r\ • i

QA£

MCPEIS
3 00 EAST SUITE 200
CITY, DT 841112504
PACE
MAIN
CITY

UT 841010000

.

U
^^nn tl
Deputy Court Cleric
In compliance wirh the Americans with D i s a b i l i t i e s Actf individuals
needing special accommodations (including a u x i l i a r y communicative
aids and services) during t h i s proceeding should c a l l Third
D i s t r i c t Court at 801-238-7391 a t l e a s t t h r e e working days prior ro
the proceeding.

P^rrza

n
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• • • r* r»! • ^ «
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^,

NATHAN D. PACE, (6626)
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE ^04
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (301) 355-9700
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MYRA MARGIS,

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
AND TO STRIKE ANSWER
AND ENTER JUDGMENT

'laintiff,

Civil No. 9409C51T7CV
BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Judse: Leslie Lewis

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Nathan D. Pace, and hereby moves
the Court for an Order holding the Defendant in Contempt for failing to comply with the
previously entered settlement stipulation before the Court, and if the Defendant fails to appear at
the August 14, 1998 pretrial conference and otherwise comply with the Court order of holding
meaningful settlement discussions prior to that Conference, that the Court should Strike
defendant's answer and enter a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff in this case.
Plaintiff requests this motion be heard and argued by parties before the Court at the
Pretrial scheduled for August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm.

1

The Panies previously came before the Court and prior to trial entered into and agreed to
a stipulated settlement which was placed on the record by the Court and approved by the Court.
Among ihe terms and as part of that stipulation, the Defendant was required to deliver the sum
of S900.00 to the plaintiff and make an accounting of the items taken from the Plaintiff. The
panies met at an appointed time to deliver the items to the Plaintiff and the delivered items were
inventoried by Counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant handed counsel for Plaintiff a check for S900.00
at that time. Counsel for Plaintiff requested that Defendant initial the inventory list when the
delivery was completed, Defendant refused.

When counsel again requested that he initial the

inventory list, Defendant ripped the S900.00 check from counsel for Plaintiffs hand, and drove
away in his truck, nearly running over Plaintiff.
Several times during the ensuing months, Counsel for Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendant
would discuss this matter. Counsel for Defendant would state mat he was having a hard time
communicating with his client, but that he would get him to redeliver the check as previously
agreed to.

However the check has never been delivered. As such, since the Defendant has

shown a complete unwillingness to comply with the previous and what was intended to be a final
stipulation and order of the Coun regarding this matter, the Plaintiff moves the Coun to hold the
Defendant in Contemot for failing to Comolv.
Further, the Court has ordered the panies appear on August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm for a
pretrial conference and to have held meaningful discussions as to settlement prior to that date.
Counsel for Plaintiff believes that neither defendant nor Counsel for Defendant will attend nor will
2

they participate in discussions prior to the hearing. If Defendant's do not participate in good faith
settlement discussions and if they do not attend the August 14, 1998 hearing, Plaintiff moves the
Court to strike the Defendant's Answer in this matter and immediately enter a default judgment
for the Plaintiff according to the terms contained in Plaintiffs complaint.
Plaintiff should not be continually punished for Defendant's unwillingness to abide by the
previous Order of the Court,
Plaintiff further asks the Court to order Defendant to pay to Plaintiff an award of S2,500
m attorneys fees in this matter which reoresent 20 hours at S 125.00 which has been a more than
reasonable amount of hts charged in tm^maner to date by Counsel for Plaintiff
DA i ED THIS_iL_cay ot^M

"Nathan D. Pace CS
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OPgERVTCE
I hereby certify that on this jL-day of/ /

'cr

^ ' ' * /l998 T I had a true and correct

copy ot the foregoing Motion sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Jerold D. Mcphee
336 South 300 East #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

Case N o : 940905177 CV

VS.

3SRT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Clerk":

MINUTES
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE LEWIS
August 14, 19S8

chslls

PRESENT
(s) : MYRA MARGIS
Plainti
PI air.-i. 's Attorney (s): NATHAN D,
Video

!

ACS

HEARING
Based on the' failure to appear of the defendant * and his counsel
the.Court grants attorney fees: in the "amount of $480.00, further
the plaintiff is''awarded-travel costs" in .the amount of $500.00."
The defendant, is to pay the amounts before uhe case will
proceed .'to trial or hearing.'.-;'- ;'
At. the next- hearing the plaintiff may appear by telephone.
:
The'"court orders failure-to appear, b y the defendant or an attorney
for .the defendant (Mr McPhie or" partners) will result in the
defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for
the plaintiff. The next hearing is set for 8/21/98 at 4:00 pm
Counsel for the plaintiff is to send notice by mail and by fax to
Mr McPhie..

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY RE: MOTION TO SET
ASIDE
Case No: S40905177

vs.
3ZRT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS
Date: 10/27/2000

Clerk: chells
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of
Judicial Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Judgemnt and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after
having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and
the court's file, the Court denies the motion,
he orevious Ora^
and Award of Fees remains in "Place

fud^e

(JA^L
LESLIE A.

Ittef
LEWIS

//- /£r ^O

v* '••

Jl

Case No: 940905177
Date:
Oct 27, 2000
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 940905177 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this #

\] day of

fVJW

NAME
JEROLD D. MCPEES
ATTORNEY DEF
33 6 SOUTH 3 00 EAST SUITE 2 00
SALT LAKE CITY, UT S411I2504
NATHAN D. PACE
ATTORNEY ?LA
13 6 S MAIN ST
SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000
20 ^

.

A/1
M l\ C
Deputy Court Clerk

Jeroid D. McPhee (3662)
Attorney for the Defendant
320 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)322-1616

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

MYRA MARGIS.
NOTICE TO SUBMIT
FOR DECISION
VS.

Case No. 940905177 CV
BERT LIE72.
Judse: Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

The following motion(s). as provided pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501 (d) of the UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, are now at issue and ready for decision of the coun. The
documents indicated have been filed with the court.
1.

(a)

Tvpe of motion: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO -STRIKE PLAINTIFF" S
RESPONSE

(b)

Date filed: October 15,1998

(c)

Party filing motion: DEFENDANT

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

XX Memorandum in support

(f)

_ _ _ Affidavit in opposition
-1-

(g)

Memorandum in opposition

.(h)

Memorandum in reply

(i)

Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

(a)
Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES.
(b)

Date filed: November 24. 2000

(c)

Part}'filing motion: DEFENDANT

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

Memorandum in support

(f)

Affidavit in opposition

(g)

Memorandum in opposition

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(i)

Other pieading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify-):

(a)

Type of motion: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS
PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES.

(b)

Date filed: December 4. 2000.

(c)

Party filing motion: PLAINTIFF

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

Memorandum in support

(f)

Affidavit in opposition

g)

Memorandum in opposition

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(0

Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

(a)

Type of motion: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORTHE RELEASE OF FUNDS.

(b)

Dare filed: December 4, 2000.

©

Party filing moiion: PLAINTIFF

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

Memorandum in support

(f)

-'

Affidavit in opposition

(g)

Memorandum in opposition

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(I)

Other pieading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

(a)

Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S 03JECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES.

(b)

Date filed: December 8, 2000.

©

Party filing motion: DEFENDANT

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

Memorandum in support

(f)

Affidavit in opposition

(g)

Memorandum in opposition
-

J

-

6.

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(i)

Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

(a)

Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF FUNDS.

(b)

Date filed: December 11, 2000.

(c) •'

Party filing motion: PLAINTIFF

(d)

Affidavit in support

(e)

Memorandum in support

(f)

Affidavit in opposition

(g)

'

Memorandum in opposition

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(i)

Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

lis NO
DATED this
V

da*
day

of February, 2001.
Re§£s«nifl^submit

Attorney forHheJdefendam

-4-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION was mailed, first class postage thereon prepaid, this y-rz/dav of February, 2001, to:

• Nathan D. Pace and David Pace
136 South Main Street, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ti^:o/?~jQ>
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it-U.;j

\n~
JEROLD D. MCPHEE #3662
320 SOUTH 300 EAST, SUITE #200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2537
(801)322-1616
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MYRA MARGIS,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,

}

V.

}

BERT LIETZ,

}

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV

APPLLEANT COURT NO.:

}

CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS NOT REQUIRED

Appellant, Bert Lietz, by and through counsel, Jerold d. McPhee, certifies to the
court that no transcript will be requested in the above-entitled action. The court file has
the transcript, which will be used in this matter. It was prepared on 14 June 1996, and
was filed the court on 28 August 1999. We will rely on any other transcript, which is
contained in the court record.
Dated this J L

day of

_,'2001.
NT

TtJ.' A*pgs
D. McPh^
Attorney for the Defendant and Appellant

Page2
Certificate that Transcript is not Required
District Court Case Number: 940905177CV
Appellant Court Number:
Plaintiff/Appellee: Myra Margis
Defendant/Appellant: Bert Lietz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I certify that on this )
day of £^^(T
, 2001, I
personally placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in a sealed envelope. I further
certify that I placed the same in the United States Postal System, postage prepaid, and
addressed to the following:
Nathan and David Pace
136 South Main Street, Suite #404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

